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INTRODUCTION
1

The Confrontation Clause guarantees to the accused a process,
2
not a product. The essential purpose of the Clause is to provide the
3
accused with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the development of the testimonial case against him or her, through the
crucible of cross-examination, but does not guarantee to the accused
4
that participation will produce either a favorable or a reliable result.

1

U.S. CONST. amend. VI: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”
2
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a
substantive guarantee.”). See also Lagunas v. State, No. 03-03-00566-CR, 2005 WL
2043678, at *9 (Tex. App. Aug. 26, 2005) (“A central holding of Crawford is that the
Confrontation Clause is a rule of procedure, not of evidence.”).
3
“Meaningful” may be subject to interpretation. See Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d
798, 801 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“Crawford does not expressly address the issue
of whether the opportunity for cross must be ‘meaningful,’ although common sense
suggests that this notion is implicit in Crawford. Indeed, what constitutes a ‘meaningful’ opportunity for cross might be the subject of much debate in the years to
come.”).
4
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“[The Confrontation Clause] commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing
in the crucible of cross-examination.”); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559
(1987) (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)) (“[W]e agree with the
answer suggested 18 years ago by Justice Harlan. ‘[T]he Confrontation Clause guar-
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Likewise, the reliability of the testimonial evidence is not a substitute,
under the Clause, for the absence of such a meaningful opportunity
5
to participate. This is the essence of the Supreme Court’s new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in the case of Crawford v.
6
Washington.
The Crawford decision, by a significant 7-2 majority, rejected
twenty-four years of flawed constitutional confrontation jurisprudence regarding the admission of hearsay against the criminal
7
accused. Lower courts’ early reactions to this decision, though explored extensively below, include such remarks as these:
8
 “[A] Copernican shift in federal constitutional law. . . .”
 “So what is all the fuss about? A paradigm shift in
9
[C]onfrontation [C]lause analysis, that’s what.”
 “Crawford redefines the scope and effect of the Confron10
tation Clause . . . .”
 “[A] recent and substantial change in Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence announced by the United States Supreme
11
Court . . . .”
12
 “[A] case of great importance.”
 “[Crawford] may fairly be characterized as a revolutionary
13
decision in the law of evidence.”
antees only “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that
is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”’”).
5
“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin
to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what
the Sixth Amendment prescribes.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. Here Justice Scalia echoes a previous conclusion by Professor Jonakait: “Just as the state cannot deny an
accused a jury trial by establishing that a nonjury trial was the better way to determine the facts, the accused cannot be denied an adversary criminal trial even if an
inquisitorial proceeding would have determined the truth better in the accused’s
case.” Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment,
35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 585 (1988).
6
541 U.S. 36 (2004). Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, concurring in the judgment only, wrote an opinion, joined by Justice
O’Connor. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
7
In Crawford, the Court rejected its rationale and analytical framework from
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), for determining admissibility under the Confrontation Clause of “testimonial” hearsay against an accused. For further discussion, see
infra notes 48–55 and accompanying text (exploring the many criticisms of Roberts).
8
People v. Victors, 819 N.E.2d 311, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
9
People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 851 (Ct. App. 2004), review granted, 99
P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
10
United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2004).
11
Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
12
United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004).
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“[Crawford effected] a sea change in our understanding
14
of the [C]onfrontation [C]lause . . . .”
One judge predicted that “the fallout from Justice Scalia’s ‘clarification’ of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford will reverberate
through the evidentiary landscape for some time to come and will
15
create countless dilemmas for trial and appellate courts . . . .” Crawford necessitates that we rethink our approach to the question of
admissibility of hearsay on behalf of the prosecution under the Confrontation Clause. The purpose of this Article is to clarify—to the
extent that such is possible—this new approach, the rationale behind
it, and to explore its present and potential impact.
A. The Crawford Case
The facts of Crawford are unremarkable. Michael Crawford, accompanied by his wife Sylvia, sought out and located Kenneth Lee,
16
ostensibly because Lee had attempted to rape Sylvia. Upon locating
him in his apartment, a fight ensued between Michael and Lee. As a
result, Lee was stabbed, and Michael’s hand was cut during the alter17
18
Police, after giving appropriate Miranda warnings,
cation.
19
interrogated both Michael and Sylvia two times. Michael’s account
of the incident was to the effect that prior to the blow, he “coulda
20
swore” he saw Lee going for “somethin’.” Sylvia’s account, though
generally corroborating Michael’s as it related to events leading up to
the fight, differed in its description of the fight itself. According to
Sylvia, as Michael approached Lee, “[Lee] lifted his hand over his
head maybe to strike Michael’s hand down or something and then he
put his . . . right hand in his right pocket . . . took a step back . . .
21
She added that, at that
[and] Michael proceeded to stab him.”
moment, Lee’s hands were out and open and he had nothing in
22
them.

13
14
15

People v. Pantoja, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 498 (Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Grace, 111 P.3d 28, 36 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005).
Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (Crone, J., concur-

ring).
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
Id.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 39–40.

LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

2006]

CONFRONTATION AFTER CRAWFORD

1/9/2006 12:11:42 PM

331

Washington charged Michael Crawford with assault and at23
tempted murder. At his trial, Michael asserted that he acted in self24
defense. Michael prevented his wife from testifying by asserting a
Washington evidentiary spousal privilege that permits an accused to
prevent his or her spouse from testifying for the prosecution, but this
privilege did not preclude the state from attempting to introduce
25
otherwise admissible prior statements of Sylvia. The state successfully convinced the trial court to admit Sylvia’s custodial account of
the fight over Michael’s hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections.
The trial court found the declaration admissible under the state’s
26
“statement against interest” hearsay exception.
Regarding the Confrontation Clause issue, the trial court, applying the analytical framework espoused in the Supreme Court’s
27
decision in Ohio v. Roberts, found sufficient “indicia of reliability”
surrounding the making of Sylvia’s statement to satisfy the Clause and
justify the introduction of the now-unavailable spouse’s prior state28
29
ment. Crawford was convicted of assault. The Washington Court
of Appeals reversed, applying a nine-factor test for determining reliability under the Roberts “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”
30
prong. The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction,
finding that Sylvia’s declaration bore sufficient “guarantees of trustworthiness” because, since neither Michael’s nor Sylvia’s statements
clearly asserted that Lee had a weapon in his hand before being
23

Id. at 40.
Id.
25
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. One issue not raised in the Supreme Court by the
state in this case was that, by asserting the privilege, Michael in effect “waived” his
right to cross-examine Sylvia and thereby was afforded his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Before the Washington Court of Appeals, the state made the
argument regarding waiver, but such was rejected. Id. at 42 n.1. That court found
that requiring the defendant to choose between assertion of the marital privilege and
confronting his spouse creates an impermissible “Hobson’s choice.” Id. (citing State
v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 660 (Wash. 2002)). For discussion of the possible application of the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” rule as to these circumstances, see infra notes
123–39 and accompanying text.
26
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
27
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
28
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. The trial court’s reasoning included: Sylvia was not
trying to shift blame; she was somewhat supporting Michael’s claim of self defense or
at least “justified reprisal”; she had first-hand knowledge; her statement was given
shortly after the incident; and she gave the statement to a detective that was a “neutral” interrogator. Id.
29
Id. at 41.
30
Id. That court found it unreliable, in part, because Sylvia’s statement contradicted an earlier one (she said she shut her eyes at one point in the fight) and the
statement contradicted rather than corroborated Michael’s statement. Id.
24
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stabbed, the statements overlapped and interlocked, thereby render31
ing Sylvia’s testimony reliable. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether the introduction of Sylvia’s dec32
laration violated the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
B. Crawford’s Holding
Rejecting Ohio v. Roberts’s analytical approach and declining to
“mine the record” for “indicia of reliability,” the Supreme Court held
that the prosecution’s introduction of Sylvia’s “testimonial” hearsay
statement violated Michael Crawford’s right of confrontation because
Sylvia was unavailable at trial and Michael had no prior, meaningful
33
opportunity to cross-examine her. Chief Justice Rehnquist, though
concurring in the judgment, wrote a separate opinion, joined by Justice O’Connor, claiming that the majority had unnecessarily
overruled its previous seminal holding in Roberts and that the Court’s
new interpretation of the Clause would create a “mantle of uncer34
tainty” in future criminal trials.
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND HEARSAY
As Professor Richard D. Friedman observed, since the Supreme
35
Court held in Pointer v. Texas that the Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation in the United States Constitution was binding in state
prosecutions, greater emphasis has been placed on the Confrontation Clause’s relationship to the admissibility of hearsay in criminal
36
prosecutions. Thus, the need for the Court to develop an analytical
approach for determining the Clause’s role in regulating the intro37
duction of hearsay became more imperative. Though some argued
that the Clause should not regulate hearsay at all and that its admissi38
bility should be governed only by evidence law, the Supreme Court
39
rejected this view in California v. Green, stating:
31

Id. at 41–42.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
33
Id. at 68–69.
34
Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
35
380 U.S. 400 (1965).
36
Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J.
1011, 1014 (1998).
37
Id.
38
Professor John Wigmore, consistent with Justice Harlan, took the view that the
Confrontation Clause merely requires that witnesses actually produced be subject to
cross-examination by the accused and that a hearsay declarant, who is not produced,
is not such a witness. Therefore, in his view, the Clause did not regulate the admissi32
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While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,
it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete
and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a
codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they
existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we have more than once
found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized
hearsay exception. The converse is equally true: merely because
evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule
does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation
40
rights have been denied.

The parameters of the relationship of the Clause and the admissibility of hearsay were not delineated by the Supreme Court until Ohio v.
Roberts, in which it concluded:
The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with
the Framers’ preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth
Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. . . .
The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to be unavailable. Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy
in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective
means to test adverse evidence, the Clause countenances only
hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that “there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.”. . .
....
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires
a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “indicia of reliability.” Reliability
can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of
41
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.

Implicit in this holding is that every hearsay declarant is a “witness against” for confrontation purposes. As such, that declarant’s
out-of-court statement is admissible when the declarant does not testify at trial only if a “necessity” for the statement can be
bility of hearsay at all. Patricia W. Bennett, After White v. Illinois: Fundamental Guarantees to a Hollow Right to Confront Witnesses, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 159, 162 (1993).
39
399 U.S. 149 (1970).
40
Id. at 155–56 (citations omitted).
41
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980) (citations omitted).
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demonstrated, and the proponent is able to show that the hearsay was
produced under circumstances so as to possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. In other words, hearsay from a non-testifying
42
declarant, under the Clause, is admissible if it is intrinsically needed
43
and it is intrinsically reliable. Though the prosecutor has the burden to demonstrate the intrinsic reliability of the hearsay sought to
be admitted, such burden is substantially alleviated if the hearsay falls
44
within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception.” According to some critical scholars, classifying hearsay as falling within a “firmly rooted”
hearsay exception in order to avoid individualized analysis of reliability further exacerbated the efficacy of the Clause’s protection because
of the ease by which the classification of “firmly rooted” has been ap45
plied and the conclusive effect of such classification. Some argue
42

Originally, the Roberts framework seemed to contemplate that the usual circumstance justifying a finding of necessity would be the unavailability of the
declarant’s present testimony. However, the Court subsequently in United States v.
Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (affirming admission of co-conspirator statements
whether or not the declarant is available), and White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992)
(discussing excited utterances and statements for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment), expanded the concept of necessity to include the need for the “better”
evidence: that the hearsay was generated under circumstances that makes it arguably
more reliable than the present, perhaps selfserving, testimony from the same declarant. See Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-To-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L.
REV. 863, 876 (1988) (“The Court in Inadi limited the ‘unavailable-first’ language of
Roberts by stating that the prosecution need only demonstrate the witness’s unavailability when the hearsay is a ‘weaker substitute for live testimony.’”).
43
In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), the Court, in a narrow 5-4 opinion, rejected the view that reliability for confrontation purposes could be determined by the
existence of corroborating evidence that confirms the truth of what was asserted in
the hearsay statement. Id. at 820–24. The majority concluded that the determination of reliability was limited to examining the circumstances of the creation of the
hearsay in order to determine that the declarant was likely sincere and accurate
when he asserted the facts contained in the hearsay. Id. These circumstances are
called “indicia of reliability” or “guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. at 815 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). In Crawford v. Washington, the Court noted that the concept of
“indicia of reliability” is quite subjectively identified; allows opposite construction of
identical indicia; and the determination is likely influenced by the desired result.
541 U.S. 36, 63–64 (2004).
44
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (“Reliability can be inferred without more in the case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”); White, 502 U.S.
at 355 n.8 (“[I]t is this factor that has led us to conclude that ‘firmly rooted’ exceptions carry sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirement posed
by the Confrontation Clause.”).
45
See, e.g., Nancy H. Baughan, Recent Developments: White v. Illinois: The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court’s Preference for Out-of-Court Statements, 46 VAND. L. REV.
235, 261 (1993) (The Supreme Court has never defined what is a “firmly rooted”
hearsay exception and that some courts have used criteria such as the longevity of
the exception, an exception’s widespread acceptance, or its codification in the Federal Rules of Evidence to determine that a particular exception is indeed firmly
rooted. The author concludes that none of the justifications absolutely guarantees
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46

that, since the decision in White v. Illinois, the Court has effectively
constitutionalized the hearsay rules and most of the exceptions in
47
spite of its previous declaration to the contrary in Green.
Roberts’ two-pronged analytical framework has been applied by
the Court to a diverse array of hearsay, such as the following: former
48
49
testimony, co-conspirator admissions, excited utterances and
50
statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, and
51
statements against interest. As these examples reflect, its application was used to regulate more than simply “testimonial” declarations.
Criticism of Roberts’ two-pronged analytical framework has been
persistent, as reflected in this comment by one scholarly observer:

the reliability of admitted hearsay and notes the risk that “a court will give a presumption of constitutionality to evidence that is not necessarily reliable” without a
clear definition of “firmly rooted.”) (internal references omitted); John G. Douglass,
Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 207–08 (1999) (“Under the general
approach of Roberts, a ‘firmly rooted’ hearsay exception defines a class of hearsay
statements so reliable that cross-examination would add very little to the jury’s ability
to assess them. Given these theoretical origins, one might expect that the two decades since Roberts would have produced a test for distinguishing ‘firm’ from ‘not so
firm’ roots based on the likely reliability of statements falling within a given exception. Instead, the Court’s standards—if there really are any standards at all—show
little concern for reliability.”) (footnotes omitted); Eleanor Swift, Smoke and Mirrors:
The Failure of the Supreme Court’s Accuracy Rationale in White v. Illinois Requires a New
Look at Confrontation, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 145, 154 (1993) (“The White majority’s accuracy rationale also fails because the doctrinal test it relies on—the concept of firmly
rooted hearsay exceptions, originated in Ohio v. Roberts—shifts between longevity and
political acceptance of the hearsay exceptions and, therefore, its application yields
no meaningful guarantee of accuracy.”) (footnote omitted).
46
502 U.S. 346 (1992).
47
See Bennett, supra note 38, at 188–89:
. . . White virtually eviscerates the Confrontation Clause, consigning
its corpse to burial in the hearsay rules of evidence. Before White, the
Court was careful not to join the Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule. . . . As such, evidence law now defines the contours
of the Confrontation Clause: hearsay definitions now shape the Clause.
The White Court has pried the top off the evidentiary rules of hearsay,
and dumped into its body the dictates of the Confrontation Clause.
(footnotes omitted).
48
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 72–73 (treating testimony in a preliminary hearing subject
to cross-examination just like testimony in a prior trial).
49
Two cases focused on co-conspirator admissions are Bourjaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171 (1987), and United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
50
White, 502 U.S. at 355 (noting “substantial guarantees of . . . trustworthiness”
associated with excited utterances and statements made in the course of obtaining
medical care).
51
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 (1999) (clarifying that accomplice admissions that also support the guilt of a defendant are not within a firmly rooted
exception).
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Commentators and certain contemporary Justices have long
criticized and bemoaned the Supreme Court’s current analytical
union between the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause.
Such criticism has run the gambit between labeling the Court’s
current approach as a “poor criter[ion]” for governing the Confrontation Clause to labeling the current approach as one which
would “constitutionalize the hearsay rule.” The Court’s current
approach results in inconsistent results by setting forth ad hoc
rules to justify prior holdings, while clinging to the precept that
the hearsay rule somehow relates to the Confrontation Clause.
The specific problems associated with the Court’s current approach are numerous. First, the Court’s current approach
requires a constitutional analysis of every out-of-court statement
offered at a criminal trial, no matter how tangential to the issues
at hand. Such a zealously broad approach could not have been
intended by the framers. Second, the rigid approach set forth by
the Court could conceivably allow any out-of-court statement into
evidence which fortuitously fell into a firmly rooted hearsay exception or which demonstrated indicia of reliability, even if such
statement took the form of an ex parte affidavit or similar device.
Such an underinclusive version of the Confrontation Clause is
also inconsistent with the history of the Clause and with prior
Court holdings. Finally, the Court has bound the Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay rule under extremely transitory principles
causing prior precedent to continually be pitted against the new
factual scenarios presented to the Court. Instead of accepting the
realization that the current doctrine does not work, the Court
remains faithful to the inharmonious relationship between the
hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause by continually reinter52
preting past precedent to comport with contemporary facts.

52

Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule: The Current
State of a Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick Divorce, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 763, 800–02
(2000) (footnotes omitted).
Other examples of pre-Crawford criticism of the Supreme Court’s analytical approach to hearsay under the Confrontation Clause include: Bennett, supra note 38,
at 200 (“The Confrontation Clause certainly should stand for something. At present,
it is only a reflex to the rules of evidence. The Framers intended the Clause to occupy a more prestigious position. . . . In trials after White, cross-examination promises
to be a hollow right, and confrontation a vanishing guarantee.”); Margaret A. Berger,
The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 605–06 (1992) (“Others have so ably
demonstrated the illusory protection afforded a defendant by the evidentiary version
of confrontation . . . . If hearsay statements are being judicially analyzed to by-pass
notions of trustworthiness and confrontation is measured by the parameters of the
hearsay rule, then neither the evidentiary rule nor the constitutional doctrine will
safeguard the accused.”) (footnotes omitted); Douglass, supra note 45, at 206 (“Almost twenty years after Roberts, it is hard to conclude that the Confrontation Clause,
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Crawford v. Washington is the culmination of this dissatisfaction
with the Roberts approach. The Crawford Court echoed this criticism
in rejecting the Roberts rationale, suggesting that it permitted admission of testimonial evidence, untested through the adversarial process
of cross-examination, upon simply a judicial determination of reliability. As a result, other indicators of “reliability” became a permissible
substitute for the “prescribed method of assessing reliability”—cross53
examination. Further, myriad factors may bear on a determination
of reliability (an “amorphous” concept), and judicial identification
and weighing of these factors are subjective processes that can be in54
fluenced by a desired result or lead to contradictory conclusions.
However, the main reason cited by the Court for rejecting the Roberts
test is its “unpardonable” vice: that it permits core testimonial hearsay, not subject to cross-examination either previously or presently, to
be admitted merely upon a determination that it is “reliable” in spite
of the fact that the “Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude”
55
it.
The Court refused to “mine the record” for Roberts’s indicia of
reliability even though, had it done so, the result would likely have
56
been the same. Instead, it concluded that the Confrontation Clause
bars testimonial hearsay evidence unless the declarant presently is
subject to cross-examination, or the declarant is unavailable and the
accused was afforded a prior, meaningful opportunity to cross-

as an exclusionary rule, has much practical impact on hearsay in criminal trials. . . .
The ‘general approach’ of Roberts has evolved into an exclusionary rule that excludes
very little.”); Jonakait, supra note 5, at 622 (“In interpreting the confrontation clause,
the Supreme Court has misunderstood the purpose of the provision. As a result, evidence law now controls the content of the confrontation clause, and the clause now
offers an accused little protection.”); Massaro, supra note 42, at 881 (“This conflation
of the hearsay rules and the sixth amendment likely was prompted by the Court’s
frustration in attempts to develop a workable, independent theory of the clause.”);
Carolyn M. Nichols, The Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause: Desire to Promote Perceived Societal Benefits and Denial of the Resulting Difficulties Produces Dichotomy in the Law,
26 N.M. L. REV. 393, 429 (1996) (“The [Court’s] notion that the clause is simply a
guarantee of reliable evidence needs to be disregarded . . . .”); Swift, supra note 45, at
152 (“Under the White majority’s accuracy rationale, there is no need for crossexamination of the declarant when hearsay is admitted under firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions. The Court flatly states that such hearsay ‘is so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to its reliability.’ . . . The Justices’ claim is
overbroad, unjustified and embarrassing. I know of no commentator—academic or
practitioner—who shares this extreme view.”).
53
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004).
54
Id. at 63.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 68.
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57

examine the declarant. Finding that the custodial interrogation of
Michael Crawford’s unavailable wife, even though unsworn, was “testimonial” and also finding that there was no prior opportunity for the
accused to cross-examine her, its introduction violated the Sixth
58
Amendment.
Though Crawford’s impact is profound, its ultimate scope is
problematic. It seems clear, however, that some previous conclusions
of the Court concerning confrontation survive and are applicable to
testimonial statements. These are:
 The Confrontation Clause does not preclude nonhearsay uses of testimonial statements against an accused.
 When the prosecution seeks to admit testimonial hearsay
against the accused, and the declarant presently testifies
subject to cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause is
satisfied.
 When the prosecution seeks to introduce testimonial
hearsay against an accused having no present opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, it must demonstrate
unavailability of the declarant after a good-faith effort to
procure the witness.
 When the accused procures the unavailability of the declarant, the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule prevents the
accused from challenging testimonial hearsay on confrontation grounds.
 When a court improperly admits testimonial hearsay over
a confrontation objection, the constitutional harmless
error analysis will be applicable.
A brief exploration of these surviving elements of constitutional
confrontation analysis may be helpful in understanding Crawford’s
impact.
A. Non-hearsay Use of Testimonial Statements
In a footnote to the majority opinion, Justice Scalia, citing Ten59
nessee v. Street, writes, “[t]he Clause does not bar the use of
57

Id. See also State v. Hale, 691 N.W.2d 637, 646 (Wis. 2005) (noting that Crawford “strongly suggests” that the Confrontation Clause cannot be satisfied by
“confrontation by proxy,” and holding that a co-defendant’s prior opportunity to
cross-examine a prosecution witness who testified in his separate trial, but who was
no longer available, was insufficient to satisfy Crawford, and thus the former testimony
of this witness was inadmissible).
58
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
59
471 U.S. 409 (1985).
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testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth
60
of the matter asserted.” Several post-Crawford cases, relying on this
assertion, rejected confrontation claims regarding testimonial non61
hearsay statements. Illustrative of these cases is one decided by the
Arkansas Supreme Court, which found no confrontation violation
when a victim’s statement to police regarding alleged criminal activity
by the defendant’s cousin was offered only as evidence establishing a
62
motive for the defendant to retaliate against the victim. When a
prosecutor uses a testimonial statement for non-hearsay purposes, it
is the fact of the utterance that gives it its probative value, not its
truth. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals commented that “Crawford
does not apply where the reliability of testimonial evidence is not at issue, and a defendant’s right of confrontation may be satisfied even

60

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (citing Street, 471 U.S. at 414).
See, e.g., People v. Combs, 101 P.3d 1007, 1020 (Cal. 2004) (determining that
non-hearsay use of the co-perpetrator’s videotaped statement, made during a reenactment of a robbery and murder, and made in the presence of the defendant,
provided the basis for the introduction of an adoptive admission by the defendant
who reacted to it); People v. Lewis, 782 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (App. Div. 2004) (holding
that officers’ testimony that they informed the defendant, prior to his confession,
that the co-defendant had implicated him, was not admitted for a hearsay purpose
but simply to describe the circumstances that prompted the defendant to admit his
involvement). See also United States v. Logan, 419 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that comparing the co-conspirator’s false alibi with the “false” confession of the
defendant, for the purpose of demonstrating that the defendant was “aware” of the
plan to falsely use a baseball game as an alibi, was a non-hearsay use and constituted
no infringement of the confrontation guarantee); United States v. Eberhart, 388 F.3d
1043, 1051 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding the confrontation issue not preserved and quoting Crawford, the court went on to remark: “Were we to reach the argument on the
merits, it would fail. As discussed, Bolden’s statement was offered solely to explain
the course of the investigation. The Confrontation Clause ‘does not bar the use of
testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted’”); People v. Goldstein, 786 N.Y.S.2d 428, 431–32 (App. Div. 2004) (holding
that statements of others relied upon by an expert witness as a basis for his opinion
did not offend Crawford because they were “non-testimonial” and not offered as proof
of the facts uttered); People v. Newland, 775 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309–10 (App. Div. 2004)
(finding that statements by a burglary witness offered to explain why police searched
a shopping cart were non-hearsay and thus not controlled by Crawford); State v.
Smith, 832 N.E.2d 1286, 1291 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (considering as non-hearsay a
co-confidential informant’s taped statements, offered to show the effect they had on
the defendant and to place in context the defendant’s admissible reply, and thus not
implicating the Confrontation Clause); State v. McClanahan, No. 22277, 2005 WL
1398835 (Ohio Ct. App. June 15, 2005) (admitting as not violating the Confrontation
Clause an unidentified male’s report to a patrolling officer that a neighbor was
shooting his gun off and pointing to defendant’s house for the non-hearsay purpose
of explaining why the police went to that location and not to prove that the defendant fired a weapon).
62
Dednam v. State, No. CR 04-573, 2005 WL 23329 (Ark. Jan. 6, 2005).
61
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63

though the declarant does not testify.” Regarding non-hearsay, it is
whether the statement was made, who made it, what was said, to
whom it was said, or other circumstances surrounding its making that
produces its relevancy, and such does not depend upon the declarant’s credibility.
Instead, its probative value depends simply upon the reporter of
the statement who is in court and available for cross-examination. In
such cases, the reporter is, in essence, the “accuser” and he can be
64
confronted.
Ordinarily, upon the introduction of non-hearsay
statements, a court will give a limiting instruction to the jury to con65
fine its consideration of the statement to its non-hearsay purpose.
Where there was no such limiting instruction, but the circumstances
created no “risk that the jury would mistakenly assume the truth” of
the out of court non-hearsay testimonial statement, one court found
66
no Crawford violation.
However, even where there is a plausible
non-hearsay basis for introducing a testimonial statement, if the court
fails to give a limiting instruction and there is a risk that the jury may
have relied upon the statement for its truth, admission of the evidence must be analyzed under Crawford as if it were testimonial
67
hearsay. In some cases, even if an instruction is given, there may be
a high likelihood that the jury would not or could not follow it. If the
jury disregarded the instruction and improperly considered the testimonial statement for its truth, it would make the declarant a de
facto accuser and therefore raise confrontation concerns. In such
cases, the use of the testimonial statement even for non-hearsay pur68
poses may offend the Confrontation Clause.

63

United States v. Trala, 386 F.3d 536, 544 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 545 (noting that the opportunity to cross-examine the reporter of the
out-of-court non-hearsay statement of an accomplice satisfies the Confrontation
Clause).
65
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 105 (allowing jury instructions when evidence is admitted
for one purpose even though it would otherwise be inadmissible for another purpose). See also Lewis, 782 N.Y.S.2d at 322 (noting the presumption that a jury will
follow such an instruction).
66
Trala, 386 F.3d at 545 (observing that the relevance of a particular statement
was based upon the fact that it was “obviously false”).
67
State v. Clark, 598 S.E.2d 213, 220 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
68
Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136–37 (1968) (finding the risk too
great that a jury would, notwithstanding a limiting instruction, misuse an accomplice’s extrajudicial, custodial confession, implicating the declarant and Bruton in a
joint trial, and consider it against both the declarant and Bruton). But see Tennessee
v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (affirming admission of an accomplice’s extrajudicial,
custodial statement in the prosecutor’s rebuttal case after the accused opened the
door by referring to the accomplice’s statement in his case-in-chief).
64

LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

2006]

1/9/2006 12:11:42 PM

CONFRONTATION AFTER CRAWFORD

341

B. The Present Availability of the Hearsay Declarant to Testify and be
Cross-Examined by the Accused Satisfies the Confrontation Clause
Crawford reinforces the previously settled constitutional confrontation view by stating: “[W]hen the declarant appears for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints
69
at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.” In a series of
cases prior to Crawford, the Court determined that the belated opportunity of the accused to cross-examine the hearsay declarant at the
70
present trial satisfies the Clause. Even a substantial good faith lack
of present memory by the declarant who testifies at trial will not deprive the defendant of a sufficient opportunity to confront his
accuser, as long as the declarant is willing to answer questions pro71
pounded to him by the accused. In a recent post-Crawford case, the
69

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (citing California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)). Post Crawford, the Colorado Supreme Court explained:
Although the [Crawford] Court found the opportunity for crossexamination to be the essential requirement of the Confrontation
Clause, it did not hold that all testimonial statements must be subject
to cross-examination at the time they were made. To the contrary, if
the declarant will appear at trial, cross-examination on the witness
stand remains sufficient. The Supreme Court was careful to explain
that Crawford did not apply to instances where a witness testifies at trial.
The opinion explicitly reaffirmed the Green decision . . . .
People v. Argomaniz-Ramirez, 102 P.3d 1015, 1018 (Colo. 2004).
70
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1987) (A correctional officer’s hospital identification of Owens as the individual who brutally attacked him with a metal
pipe was properly admitted over Owens’s confrontation objection since the officer
testified at trial, subject to cross-examination, even though the officer, at trial, suffered a failure of recollection regarding the identity of the attacker and other details.
The court found this “belated” opportunity sufficient, quoting Justice Harlan: “[T]he
Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an opportunity for effective cross-examination,
not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the
defense might wish.’”) (citations omitted); Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 627–30
(1971) (holding that admission of co-defendant Runnels’ pretrial confession implicating himself and O’Neil over defendant O’Neil’s confrontation objection in their
joint trial did not violate the Clause where Runnels subsequently testified in his own
behalf, giving O’Neil a belated opportunity to cross-examine him); Green, 399 U.S. at
161, 164–65 (No Confrontation Clause violation found in the introduction of a custodial statement and preliminary hearing testimony of a sixteen-year-old drug seller,
identifying the defendant as his drug supplier, where the defendant had a belated
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, even though the declarant admitted
making the prior statements but could not “remember” much of their contents. The
Court stated that it was not convinced that contemporaneous cross-examination of
the declarant at the time the statement is made and before the trier of fact is so
much more effective than belated cross-examination of the declarant that the former
should be made the “touchstone of the Confrontation Clause”).
71
Owens, 484 U.S. at 556, 561 (noting that Foster, the declarant, did have some
significant recollection even though he suffered substantial memory loss). One
wonders whether a nearly complete good faith failure of recollection would still sat-

LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

342

1/9/2006 12:11:42 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:327

Supreme Court of South Dakota found no Crawford violation arising
from the admission of various statements of a four-year-old child to
family, police, and clinicians because the child, though likely having
72
no present, accurate recollection, was available to testify at trial. As
a result, the South Dakota court reversed a pre-trial order that had
73
excluded these statements.
Similarly, a testifying declarant’s present bad faith claim of lack
of memory would not preclude a court from finding a sufficient op-

isfy the Clause. It would seem under such circumstances, the declarant would be, in
effect, incompetent, and therefore “unavailable” for confrontation purposes. On
this we must await further clarification by the Supreme Court. As to this issue, see
State v. Gorman, 854 A.2d 1164 (Me. 2004). In a prosecution of her son for murder,
the mother testified for the state that she did not recall her son’s confession to her
after the killing nor could she recall grand jury testimony to that effect. Id. at 1177.
The State thereupon introduced her prior inconsistent statement given at the grand
jury proceeding under a hearsay exception. Id. In the Maine Supreme Court, the
defendant contended his confrontation rights were violated under the Crawford test
because the mother was essentially “unavailable” for present cross-examination. Id.
The Court rejected this contention stating: “In Owens, the United States Supreme
Court held that even when a witness has no present memory of a prior out-of-court
statement, the right of confrontation is satisfied if the accused has the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness at trial . . . .” Id. See also United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39,
46–47 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (applying Owens prior to Crawford, the court held that the introduction of grand jury testimony by a witness who at trial testified and claimed that,
due to drug addiction, she had no memory of her testimony or the basis for it, did
not violate the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation); People v. Harless, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 625, 637 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a child sexual assault victim’s partial
memory failure, which neither precluded her from explaining her prior statements
nor prevented the jury from assessing her demeanor and determining which was
most credible—her present testimony or prior statements—afforded the defendant
an opportunity for effective cross-examination so as not to violate the Confrontation
Clause under Crawford); State v. Fields, No. 25455, 2005 WL 1274539 (Haw. Ct. App.
May 31, 2005) (concluding that a girlfriend’s claim of lack of memory regarding the
defendant’s abuse and her conversations with the police about it did not preclude
her from being subject to cross-examination and negated any confrontation objection to the introduction of her prior testimonial statements); State v. Price, 110 P.3d
1171, 1174 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the introduction of a four-year-old
sexual abuse victim’s testimonial statement did not offend the Confrontation Clause
where the child testified at trial subject to cross-examination even though, when
asked to describe the abuse, she replied, “Me [sic] forgot”).
72
State v. Carothers, 692 N.W.2d 544, 549 (S.D. 2005). See also Johnson v. State,
878 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 2005) (holding that a detective’s trial testimony relating a
statement made to him by a witness, wherein the witness revealed overhearing the
defendant and another describing a burglary and shooting was admissible under
Crawford since the witness testified subject to cross-examination, and the fact that the
witness could not recall speaking to the detective and could not recall any details of
the conversation between the defendant and the other person did not preclude satisfaction of the accused’s confrontation rights).
73
Carothers, 692 N.W.2d at 549.
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74

portunity for the accused to confront the accuser. In such a case,
through examination of the declarant, the accused can inquire as to
the reasons for the declarant’s faulty memory and other circumstances so that the jury can observe both the declarant’s demeanor
and present testimony and then determine whether to rely on the
current explanation or accept the prior testimonial statement. Obviously, a declarant who appears at the present trial but refuses to
answer questions propounded by the accused—or successfully asserts
75
a privilege—would not be available for confrontation purposes. In
one post-Crawford child sexual assault case, the twelve-year-old victim
testified on direct to various matters but would not answer the prose76
cutor’s questions as to the assault’s details. On cross-examination,
however, she answered every question (none of which related to the
assault’s details) propounded by the defense. There, the court concluded that the child was available for cross-examination within the
meaning of Crawford and stated, “[W]e need not decide what the legal consequences would be, if any, if she had instead answered some,
77
but not all, of those questions [on cross-examination].” Additionally, severe and improper restrictions upon the scope of permissible
cross-examination imposed by the trial court can preclude a mean78
ingful opportunity to confront the witness.

74

See, e.g., Dicaro v. United States, 772 F.2d 1314, 1327 (7th Cir. 1985) (An accomplice’s grand jury testimony was properly admitted in spite of the declarant’s
present trial testimony that he had almost total amnesia. The court, determining the
claim to have been in bad faith and noting that the declarant responded to extensive
questioning by the accused, stated that this “lapse nonetheless did not so negatively
affect ‘the jury’s ability to determine the veracity of the out-of-court statement’” that
it offended the Confrontation Clause) (citations omitted); but see State v. Williams,
889 So. 2d 1093, 1101 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (No opportunity for effective crossexamination existed where the declarant-accomplice denied making the prior statement and refused to testify further on behalf of the state but agreed to answer the
defendant’s questions. The court stated, “It would make no sense for the defense to
ask [the accomplice] about a statement that he testified he did not make.”).
75
Owens, 484 U.S. at 561–62 (“Just as with the constitutional prohibition, limitations on the scope of examination by the trial court or assertions of privilege by the
witness may undermine the process to such a degree that meaningful crossexamination within the meaning of the Rule no longer exists.”); see also Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004) (Crawford’s wife was determined to be unavailable by asserting a spousal privilege).
76
People v. Sharp, 825 N.E.2d 706, 712–13 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
77
Id. at 713.
78
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (noting the trial court’s restriction
precluding defense questioning of a key prosecution witness as to his prior juvenile
criminal behavior, which would have strongly suggested bias, violated the accused’s
confrontation rights).
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For the declarant to be present and subject to cross-examination
by the accused, it need not always be the government that calls the
79
declarant to testify. In Nelson v. O’Neil, the declarant testified on his
own behalf in the joint trial, satisfying his co-defendant’s confronta80
tion rights. There are times when the prosecution may desire to
introduce testimonial hearsay in lieu of calling an available declarant.
In such cases, the state, desiring to avoid a confrontation issue, may
find a possible solution to this dilemma. The evidentiary rule preva81
82
lent in the federal system and in many states permits a person
against whom hearsay is admitted (in this case the accused) to call an
available hearsay declarant exercising his right to Compulsory Proc83
ess, and then cross-examine the declarant regarding the statement.
84
This procedure may satisfy the Clause if exercised and may consti85
tute a waiver of confrontation rights if not exercised. A number of
commentators and one pre-Crawford court would likely ridicule this
86
suggestion. Of course, for waiver to occur, the government must
79

402 U.S. 622 (1971).
Id. at 622.
81
FED. R. EVID. 806.
82
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.806 (1999). See also Douglass, supra note 45, at 252 (referring to numerous states’ rules along with the common law).
83
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
84
See State v. Lanski, 696 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 2005) (concluding, without mentioning Rule 806, that a confrontation objection to introduction of the accused’s
wife’s hearsay as a testimonial statement was waived by his calling her to testify).
85
See Douglass, supra note 45, at 229 (“Properly applied, however, a rule providing that defendants must request a subpoena to invoke the confrontation right
should not work serious hardship on defendants. In essence, the rule requires that a
defendant mean what he says when he asks for confrontation.”); id. at 243 (reporting
that the Supreme Court in “Inadi tells us that ‘if [the defendant] independently
wanted to secure [the declarant’s] testimony, . . . [t]he Compulsory Process Clause
would have aided [him] in obtaining the testimony’ and Federal Rule of Evidence
806 would permit the defendant to question that declarant ‘as if under crossexamination.’”) (footnote omitted). One court recently went further and held that
Crawford’s requirement that there be an “opportunity” for cross-examination is met
when the accused is given notice of the charges against him, is given a copy of the
witnesses’ statement, and he has an opportunity to depose that witness. Blanton v.
State, 880 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). This appears a bit extreme. But
see Lowery v. Collins, 996 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the failure of the defendant, in a child sexual assault prosecution, to call the available victim as a witness
did not constitute a “waiver” of his confrontation rights, reasoning that such would
create a constitutionally impermissible choice between exercising his right of confrontation or insisting on his due process right to have the state satisfy its burden of
proof). In contrast, compare these cases with State v. Cunningham, 903 So. 2d 1110
(La. 2005), discussed infra notes 274–75.
86
One such commentator writes as follows:
The ultimate in burden-shifting is endorsed by the White majority
opinion when it states that defendants can themselves call hearsay de80
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have placed the accused on notice of its intent to introduce the testimonial hearsay in time for the accused realistically to compel the
declarant’s attendance and testimony pursuant to this evidentiary
87
rule.
C. The Confrontation Clause’s Unavailability Requirement
To dispense with present cross-examination of a witness who
furnishes testimonial evidence against the accused, there must be a
necessity to do so, and the accused must have had a prior meaningful
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. However, unlike under the
88
pre-Crawford analytical framework, necessity under Crawford is limclarants as hostile witnesses. This idea borders on the ludicrous, particularly when such declarants are the victims of the alleged crime, as
was the case in White. The risk of calling a non-prepared and therefore
unpredictable hostile witness, let alone the victim, are enormous.
Swift, supra note 45, at 168 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, another author offers the
following:
The Inadi approach changes this scheme with regard to hearsay
from an available declarant. Now the defendant must produce the person he wishes to confront, and he must wait until it is his turn to
produce witnesses before he can cross-examine. This approach suggests that our entire trial system could be similarly restructured in such
a way that the opposing side would not be allowed to cross-examine a
witness after he testifies, but would only be permitted to call the witness
and conduct cross-examination as part of its own case. In other words,
the prosecution would be allowed to introduce all its direct examination from several witnesses unimpeded by defense cross-examination.
The defense would then call those witnesses unimpeded by the prosecution’s cross-examination. Finally, the prosecution could call and
cross-examine all the favorable defense witnesses. If Inadi is correct,
this system must be constitutional, for the defendant gets his chance to
cross-examine. The change, however, is clearly a radical alteration in
the way we conduct trials, and one that should be found to violate the
sixth amendment.
Jonakait, supra note 5, at 620. Additionally, at least one court would seem to oppose
this possibility:
. . . [T]he State contends that Defendant waived his right to object
to the introduction of the Sykes [murder victim’s wife’s] statement because the court had offered him the right to subpoena Sykes as a
witness. This begs the issue. Calling Sykes as a witness, in and of itself,
would hardly render the statement admissible. Defendant should not
be required to call Mrs. Sykes as a witness simply to facilitate the State’s
introduction of evidence against the Defendant.
State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 932, 938 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
87
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (defining constitutional waiver
as the voluntary and intentional relinquishment “of a known right or privilege”).
88
In addition to satisfying the necessity prong of the Roberts formula by demonstrating the declarant was unavailable, subsequent pre-Crawford cases expanded the
concept of necessity to include the “need” to introduce the “better” evidence. Even
though the declarant may be available, prior hearsay statements would be admissible
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ited to the unavailability of the witness-declarant. What constitutes
satisfaction of the requirement of unavailability of the declarant will
likely be governed by previously existing Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. This jurisprudence reflects that unavailability of the
declarant is not limited to the physical unavailability of the declarant
but includes the unavailability of the present testimony of the decla90
rant. The declarant may be deemed presently unavailable because
91
92
93
he or she is dead, ill, or incompetent, or cannot be located or
94
compelled to appear. Additionally, the declarant may be deemed
unavailable if his or her present testimony cannot be procured be95
cause of the assertion of a privilege or a refusal of the witness to
96
respond to questions. These categories defining unavailability are
if made under circumstances making it arguably more reliable than the present testimony from the same declarant because those circumstances could not be
replicated. See supra note 42 (describing subsequent cases). See generally White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (regarding excited utterances and statements made for the
purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387
(1986) (regarding co-conspirator statements).
89
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“Where testimonial evidence
is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”).
90
See DiBattisto v. State, 480 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (observing that
the availability of the declarant contemplates “more than mere presence and includes the reasonable likelihood that he is or soon will be able to give reliable,
coherent testimony”).
91
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240–41 (1895) (upholding the admission of a deceased witness’ prior testimony).
92
See, e.g., Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821 (D.C. 1981) (recognizing sufficient “grave risks to the witness’ psychological health [to] justify excusing her live incourt testimony”); State v. Burns, 332 N.W.2d 757 (Wis. 1983) (finding that severe
mental illness that would be exacerbated if the declarant were required to testify at
trial satisfied the unavailability requirement).
93
Even mental illness, short of incompetency, may render a witness unavailable.
See, e.g., DiBattisto, 480 So. 2d at 169.
94
See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 75–76 (1980) (reporting on efforts undertaken to locate a witness).
95
See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004) (recognizing Washington’s marital privilege); People v. Seijas, 114 P.3d 742 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing
unavailability resulting from the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination).
96
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 441 A.2d 1004, 1007 (D.C. 1982) (affirming the
admission of former testimony upon bad faith refusal of the declarant to testify);
State v. Page, 104 P.3d 616, 624 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that an accomplice’s
unequivocal refusal to testify rendered him unavailable). Such refusal, however,
though rendering the witness unavailable, does not necessarily have to be in “bad
faith.” See, e.g., In re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (finding that a
seven-year-old’s refusal to continue testifying as to the sexual assault against him resulted in the child being “unavailable,” even though the child testified as to knowing
the defendant and other preliminary matters); Howard v. State, 816 N.E.2d 948 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing that a twelve-year-old’s refusal to testify due to embar-
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consistent with the requirement for unavailability under the Federal
97
Rules of Evidence for hearsay purposes.
Whether a witness-declarant’s present claim of failure of recollection would render him or her unavailable for confrontation
purposes is more problematic. The Supreme Court held in United
98
States v. Owens that a witness’s present significant good faith lapse of
memory did not render him “unavailable” for confrontation purposes
99
where the witness, presently, willingly responds to questions. The
Owens Court noted that a semantic oddity exists due to the fact that
such a significant good faith lack of memory may render the witness
“unavailable” for hearsay purposes under the Federal Rules of Evi100
dence but “available” for confrontation purposes.
Additionally, a
bad faith claim of lack of memory would not render the witness unavailable if the witness willingly responds to questions presently
101
However, if the witness suffers a good faith
propounded to him.
failure of recollection to the extent that he or she is virtually incompetent to testify to relevant matters, it is likely that the resulting
absence of a meaningful opportunity to presently examine the witness would render that person unavailable for confrontation
purposes. Cross-examination under such circumstances would be
tantamount to cross-examining a mound of clay. In such cases,
unless there was a prior opportunity for the accused to cross-examine
such a witness, the witness’s testimonial hearsay may not be constitutionally available as a substitute for his or her irretrievable memory.
A definitive determination will have to await further illumination of
102
the Owens decision by the Supreme Court.
Unavailability for confrontation purposes has a corollary requirement that the government must have made a good faith effort
to secure the present testimony of the declarant, which proved to be

rassment rendered her “unavailable”). See also Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 466
(Ind. 2005) (concluding that a witness’ refusal to answer questions while on the
stand did not make the witness unavailable for confrontation purposes in absence of
a request by the accused to compel the witness to answer).
97
FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1), (2), (4), (5).
98
484 U.S. 554 (1987).
99
Id. at 559.
100
Id. at 563. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3) (announcing that unavailability for hearsay purposes includes situations in which the declarant “testifies to a lack of memory
of the subject matter of the declarant’s statement”).
101
Dicaro v. United States, 772 F.2d 1314, 1327 (7th Cir. 1985).
102
See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (discussing Owens). In contrast,
lower court cases indicated a witness’ complete or near-complete memory loss will
not render the witness unavailable for cross-examination. See supra note 71.
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104

futile.
Post-Crawford, this requirement persists.
What constitutes
good faith in all cases of unavailability is a question of reasonableness
105
A good faith, diligent effort to produce
under the circumstances.
the declarant’s present testimony is determined by a factual analysis
of each case. The effort must be more than perfunctory and more
than simply the product of the prosecutor’s “indifference or strategic
106
preference” for the admission of the testimonial hearsay.
The
proper inquiry is whether the effort not undertaken would have been
pursued if no testimonial hearsay existed upon which the prosecutor
107
If the answer to this question is “yes,” then such failure
could rely.
would amount to a lack of good faith effort. The nature and circumstances of the unavailability, and of the viable means to overcome it,
together with the gravity of the case and importance of the witness

103

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) (“The basic litmus of Sixth Amendment unavailability is established: ‘[A] witness is not “unavailable” . . . unless the
prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial’”
(emphasis added by the Court, quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724–25
(1968))).
104
See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 540 (Cal. 2005) (applying the
unavailability requirement post-Crawford, the court noted that the necessary “due
diligence” component involves an inquiry into relevant factors such as the timeliness
of the search, importance of the hearsay, and whether leads were pursued competently, and further explaining that the prosecution has no obligation to take
“adequate preventive measures” to stop an important witness from fleeing absent
prior “knowledge of a ‘substantial risk’ of such a potential flight”); State v. Grace, 111
P.3d 28, 37 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the fact the prosecution made “no
effort whatsoever” to procure declarants of testimonial statements for trial rendered
those statements inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause); State v. Clark, 598
S.E.2d 213, 219 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (finding sufficient a demonstration of the
“State’s good-faith efforts to procure [the declarant] in order for the trial court to
declare her unavailable”).
105
Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821, 826–27 (D.C. 1981) (“This rule applies
to all cases of witness unavailability, but is moderated by the recognition that ‘the
lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness . . . is a question of
reasonableness.’” (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189 n.22 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring))).
106
People v. Arroyo, 431 N.E.2d 271, 274 (N.Y. 1982) (observing that a missing
witness’ “unavailability also had to be established to satisfy the court that the prosecutor’s failure to produce her was not due to indifference or a strategic preference for
presenting her testimony in the more sheltered form of hearing minutes rather than
in the confrontational setting of a personal appearance on the stand”).
107
State v. Edwards, 665 P.2d 59, 64 (Ariz. 1983) (supporting the idea that “[a]n
appropriate standard to apply is to ask whether the leads which were not followed
would have been the subject of investigation if the State had been trying to find an
important witness and had no transcript of prior testimony” (citing United States v.
Mann, 590 F.2d 361, 367 (1st Cir. 1978))).
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are important factors in determining the sufficiency of the govern108
ment’s efforts.
Where the unavailability of the witness is a result of death, obviously little may be required to show a good faith effort. However,
even here concerns have arisen. Should a key witness in a homicide
case be required to be sustained by extraordinary life-support systems
in order to make the witness available at a future date for crossexamination by the accused? One court found that the government
had no authority to interfere with a patient’s privacy right to remove
109
a life-sustaining apparatus to do so.
110
In an interesting post-Crawford case,
a murder defendant
claimed that the introduction of an absent alien’s testimonial statement, in spite of the fact that the defendant had a prior opportunity
for cross-examination, violated the Confrontation Clause because the
declarant was deported by the government before his retrial. The defendant claimed that a good faith effort required the government “to
ensure that its witnesses are not forcibly removed from the United
States until all appeals in a case are exhausted, because of the possi111
Finding no authority for such a “sweeping”
bility of retrial.”
responsibility and observing that the defendant did not claim the
government purposefully sought, by the deportation, to make the declarant unavailable for a possible future retrial, the court found the

108

For example, in Roberts the victim of an unlawful credit card use offense testified at the defendant’s preliminary hearing, but did not appear at trial. The court
found that the government sustained its burden of establishing that its efforts to procure the witness were reasonable. Those efforts, as determined in a “voir dire
hearing” from the testimony of the victim’s mother, were essentially that the witness
was living with the parents at the time of the preliminary hearing but had left that
summer and was traveling outside Ohio. As a result of a social worker from San Francisco contacting her, the mother had made an effort to locate her but determined
that she was no longer in San Francisco. The mother further stated that she would
not know how to reach her in an emergency. The prosecutor learned these facts
some four months prior to trial, yet issued subpoenas to the witness at her mother’s
home on five occasions—a place where she was known not to be. Justice Brennan, in
his dissent joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, took issue with this finding, writing, “It would serve no useful purpose here to essay an exhaustive catalog of the
numerous measures the state could have taken in a diligent attempt to locate Anita,”
and concluded that the sole reason why Anita was not available is that the state did
not seek to find her. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 80, 81 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The result
may be explained by the fact that the prosecution was for a low-grade felony offense
and the expenditure of further time and resources in an attempt to locate her may
have been deemed unreasonable. Still, this is a debatable conclusion under these
facts.
109
People v. Adams, 265 Cal. Rptr. 568 (Ct. App. 1990).
110
Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557 (D.C. 2005).
111
Id. at 564.
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prosecution had met its burden of demonstrating unavailability for
112
confrontation purposes.
Where the factor giving rise to a claim of unavailability is illness,
the person’s importance and prognosis may justify requesting a brief
delay of the trial, a continuance, or examination of the witness at
113
bedside in order to permit the testimony.
Unavoidable absence is a reason frequently invoked as a basis for
witness unavailability. A good faith effort in such cases depends
largely upon the circumstances. If the whereabouts of the witness are
unknown, some “diligent” effort to locate the witness must be under114
taken.
If the witness’ whereabouts are known and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the testimony is sought, a
good faith effort requires that a subpoena be properly sought and is115
The mere showing that the witness is beyond the territorial
sued.
jurisdiction of the court does not satisfy the confrontation requirement, unless the government demonstrates a good faith effort to use
available procedures to obtain voluntary cooperation of the witness
116
If no procedure exists for compelling the
or foreign jurisdiction.
presence of a witness residing in a foreign country, a good faith effort
may be found if request is made of the witness to return and testify
117
Where the witand an offer to pay expenses incurred is tendered.
ness is residing in another state, a good faith effort may require using
processes such as the Uniform Act to Secure Witnesses From Within or
118
Under the Uniform Act, if
Without a State in Criminal Proceedings.
the witness resides in a state recognizing the compact, all that is required is to apply for the issuance of a subpoena in the trial court of
112

Id.
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 1005 (Little Brown
1995).
114
See supra note 108 (discussing the diligent effort described in Roberts).
115
See Stores v. State, 625 P.2d 820 (Alaska 1980) (finding that prior testimony in
a deposition is inadmissible when the state knew that the witness both planned to
leave the area and was willing to testify at trial if called); Palmieri v. State, 411 So. 2d
985, 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that merely sending a subpoena by normal mail does not meet the burden for a good faith effort to procure a witness).
116
See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724–25 (1968) (concluding that a decision
not to even ask for a federal prisoner in a different jurisdiction to be produced because authorities might deny the request does not render a witness unavailable).
117
See Mancuso v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 223 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that even though compelling a witness residing in another country to submit
to a subpoena may be problematic, a state should still at least notify the witness of the
trial and invite the witness to come at the witness’ own expense, perhaps offer to pay
the witness’ expenses, and ultimately seek federal assistance in reaching out to the
authorities of the other country).
118
E.g., FLA. STAT. § 942.01–.06 (2001).
113
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general jurisdiction in the state where the witness is located, returnable to the trial court in the state where the witness is to testify.
Failure to comply with the subpoena would subject the witness to
contempt in the state issuing the subpoena. Where the prosecutor
fails to use this available process, the court may find that a good faith
119
Where the witness is a United
effort has not been demonstrated.
States citizen residing in a foreign country, a good faith effort to procure his attendance may require a state or federal prosecutor to seek
the issuance of a subpoena from the federal district court pursuant to
120
process provided for in the federal code.
Failure to use this procedure has resulted in a finding of a lack of good faith effort and the
121
exclusion of testimonial hearsay.
Finally, where a witness’ bad faith refusal is the basis for being
unavailable, seeking a contempt citation may be a required effort.
122
But, a contempt citation is not required in every case.

119

See State v. Zaehringer, 325 N.W.2d 754, 759 (Iowa 1982) (finding that failing
to attempt use of the provisions of the Uniform Act to Secure Witnesses from Without the State until time constraints precluded success did not meet any standard for
a good faith effort, particularly when the state knew fourteen months earlier that the
witness moved).
120
The code provides, in part, as follows:
A court of the United States may order the issuance of a subpoena requiring the appearance as a witness before it, or before a person or
body designated by it, of a national or resident of the United States
who is in a foreign country . . . if the court finds that particular testimony . . . is necessary in the interest of justice, and . . . if the court
finds, in addition, that it is not possible to obtain his testimony in admissible form without his personal appearance . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (2000).
121
People v. St. Germain, 187 Cal. Rptr. 915, 921–22 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that former testimony was improperly admitted where a state prosecutor failed to
utilize this federal procedure, the witness was in Holland, and the witness refused to
cooperate voluntarily).
122
One court chronicled the futility of seeking testimony in one such case as follows:
Here, the government told Smith that he had no Fifth Amendment
privilege to refuse to testify, and that refusing to testify would place him
in contempt of court as well as in breach of his plea agreement. It offered him protection in exchange for his testimony. Nevertheless,
Smith persisted in refusing to testify; he told the government, the trial
judge in voir dire, his appointed counsel, the trial judge again, and the
jury of his refusal. To continue efforts to try to convince the witness to
testify would have been futile in light of his steadfastness. When there
is no possibility of procuring the testimony of a witness, the law requires nothing of the prosecutor because further action would be
futile.
Jones v. United States, 441 A.2d 1004, 1007 (D.C. 1982) (footnote and citation omitted).
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D. The Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Rule Still Prevails
The Crawford Court, while rejecting the Roberts “reliability” approach, expressly accepted the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing,
which “extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable
123
grounds.”
Therefore, if the accused procures the absence of the
witness-declarant, he cannot complain that the declarant’s testimonial hearsay should not be introduced because he cannot presently
124
The Seventh Circuit explained this rule as
confront that witness.
follows:
A defendant may waive his right to object on hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds to the admission of out-of-court
statements made by a declarant whose unavailability he intentionally procured. The primary reasoning behind this rule is
obvious—to deter criminals from intimidating or “taking care of”
potential witnesses against them. But the rule is also grounded in
principles of equity. Admission of the witness’s statements at least
partially offsets the benefit the defendant obtained by his miscon125
duct.

One post-Crawford case indicated that authority exists for expanding the rule to apply even in cases where the predicate
wrongdoing is the same crime for which the defendant is being tried
and the wrongdoing was not for the purpose of precluding the wit126
127
In United States v. Mayhew, a United States
ness from testifying.
123

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). However, the Supreme Court
did not address its applicability to the facts of the case even though Sylvia’s unavailability to testify and be cross-examined stemmed from the defendant’s exercise of a
state’s spousal evidentiary privilege. The Court’s absence of comment may stem
from the fact that the state did not raise before the Supreme Court the related issue
of “waiver,” as it had in the state appellate court. Id. at 40–43. Additionally, the
Crawford Court may have declined to do so because an exercise of a legitimate privilege is not encompassed within the rule because it is not considered wrongful. See id.
at 42 n.1. Recall that the Court was not inclined to force a “Hobson’s choice” on the
defendant between marital privilege and confrontation. See supra note 25 (discussion
on waiver). It seems advisable to expand the equitable rule to cases in which the declarant’s unavailability is procured by the voluntary act of the defendant even where
that act is not “wrongful.” In such cases the defendant, truly desiring crossexamination, holds the key to such process in his hands and should not preclude the
introduction of testimonial hearsay simply because he does not want to put the key in
the lock.
124
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).
125
United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2002) (footnote
and citations omitted).
126
People v. Pantoja, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499 n.2 (Ct. App. 2004) (avoiding applying this expanded interpretation of the rule by finding the testimonial statement
inadmissible upon state hearsay rules).
127
380 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
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District Court judge actually applied an expanded doctrine under
these circumstances, stating clearly that:
Requiring the court to decide by a preponderance of the evidence the very question for which the defendant is on trial may
seem, at first glance, troublesome. . . . [H]owever, this Court
holds as follows: equitable considerations demand that a defendant forfeits his Confrontation Clause rights if the court
determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the declarant is unable to testify because the defendant intentionally
murdered her, regardless of whether the defendant is standing
trial for the identical crime that caused the declarant's unavail128
ability.

Another post-Crawford case has apparently applied the rule expan129
sively. However, a United States District Court has rejected such an
expansion, concluding that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is
130
applicable “to actions whose purpose is to prevent the testimony.”
Otherwise, no confrontation protection would be afforded to an accused in any murder prosecution regarding any deceased victim’s
131
testimonial hearsay statements.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth
132
v. Edwards, was called upon to adopt, for the state, the Doctrine of
Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Rule and to determine its scope. Finding
that some version of the doctrine had been adopted in at least fourteen states and the District of Columbia, and noting that the rule is
founded upon the sound equitable principle that one should not
133
profit by his own misconduct, the court adopted the rule.
The
court cited as further justification the fact that the rule discourages
misbehavior towards witnesses and serves to shield witnesses from
134
Considering the appropriate scope of the docthreats or harm.
trine, the court stated: “Without question, the doctrine should apply
in cases where a defendant murders, threatens, or intimidates a wit128

Id. at 968 (noting that the evidence described clearly indicated that the motive
for the killing was other than to silence her as a witness).
129
Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Tex. App. 2004) (“In light of this doctrine, we hold that Gonzalez is precluded from objecting to the introduction of
Maria’s statements on Confrontation Clause grounds because it was his own criminal
conduct (in this case, murder) that rendered Maria unavailable for crossexamination.”).
130
United States v. Jordan, No. CRIM. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at *5 (D.
Colo. Mar. 3, 2005).
131
Id. at *6.
132
830 N.E.2d 158 (Mass. 2005).
133
Id. at 168.
134
Id. at 167.
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135

ness in an effort to procure that witness’s unavailability.”
Though
finding that no court had yet expanded the rule to include collusion
between the defendant and witness, it also found that the public policy interest underlying the rule would be best served by extending its
136
scope to such collusive behavior. Thereupon the court held:
that a defendant forfeits, by virtue of wrongdoing, the right to object to the admission of an unavailable witness’s out-of-court
statements on both confrontation and hearsay grounds on findings that (1) the witness is unavailable; (2) the defendant was
involved in, or responsible for, procuring the unavailability of the
witness; and (3) the defendant acted with the intent to procure
the witness’s unavailability. A defendant’s involvement in procuring a witness’s unavailability need not consist of a criminal act,
and may include a defendant’s collusion with a witness to ensure
137
that the witness will not be heard at trial.

Another court opined that the application of this doctrine in
domestic violence cases will be problematic, stating the following:
Application of the “wrongdoing” exception to the Confrontation
Clause undoubtedly will be difficult in many domestic violence
cases where a victim does not cooperate with the prosecution. If
that is the case, police and prosecutors may then have to embark
on a separate investigation into whether the defendant caused the
victim’s unavailability. The question will probably also frequently
arise as to what amounts to “wrongdoing” by a defendant in such
a scenario, i.e. will only physical “wrongdoing” (another battery)
by a defendant suffice, or can psychological pressure on a victim
not to cooperate be enough, and if so, how is such pressure to be
138
measured?

Could the rule be expanded to apply to cases where, without “wrongdoing,” the accused, in cross examining a state witness, elicits a
portion of a testimonial statement of a non-testifying declarant,
thereby “opening the door” on redirect to the revelation of additional details of the same statement? A panel of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that it could not, stating the following:
Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether Cromer’s right to confront
the witnesses against him was violated by O’Brien’s redirect testi135

Id. at 168–69 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 169.
137
Id. at 170. In collusion cases there must be a causal connection between the
defendant’s actions and the witness’ unavailability. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 171. The
court suggested that such may be sufficient in cases where a defendant aids, encourages, or facilitates a witness’ unavailability even where that witness had previously
decided “on his own” not to testify. Id.
138
Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 951 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
136
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mony. If there is one theme that emerges from Crawford, it is that
the Confrontation Clause confers a powerful and fundamental
right that is no longer subsumed by the evidentiary rules governing the admission of hearsay statements. Thus, the mere fact that
Cromer may have opened the door to the testimonial, out-ofcourt statement that violated his confrontation right is not sufficient to erase that violation. In this, too, we agree with Professor
Friedman, who has postulated that a defendant only forfeits his
confrontation right if his own wrongful conduct is responsible for
his inability to confront the witness. If, for example, the witness is
only unavailable to testify because the defendant has killed or intimidated her, then the defendant has forfeited his right to
confront that witness. A foolish strategic decision does not rise to
the level of such misconduct and so will not cause the defendant
to forfeit his rights under the Confrontation Clause. O’Brien’s
redirect testimony relating the [confidential informant]’s physical
139
description therefore violated Cromer’s right of confrontation.

E. Harmless Error Analysis Continues to be Applicable to Crawford
Violations
As pointed out by the minority in Crawford, a trial court’s mistaken applications of the new constitutional confrontation rule
140
established by Crawford will be subject to harmless-error analysis.
Even though the majority in Crawford expressed no opinion regarding the constitutional harmless-error analysis, virtually every case
relying upon Crawford—and finding error—has undertaken to de141
One court stated that
termine whether the error was harmless.
139

United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 679 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Friedman,
supra note 36, at 1031) (internal citation omitted).
140
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 76 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
141
State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 932, 939 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (asserting the need for
harmless-error analysis despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to require it). Courts
engaging in such analysis often find a harmless Crawford error. See, e.g., People v.
Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 857–58 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the introduction of
an accomplice’s statement, made during a “classic station-house interview,” violated
the Confrontation Clause but finding it harmless); Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798,
802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that, even if testimonial and erroneously admitted, the error is harmless if the accusations contained in the statement are proved
by other witnesses such that the out-of-court statement is considered “merely cumulative”); State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 701 N.W.2d
802 (Minn. 2005) (declining to examine whether statements made to police were
testimonial after finding a jury’s verdict “surely unattributable” to the statements and
finding that their admission was thus “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v.
Bell, 603 S.E.2d 93, 116 (N.C. 2004) (holding that a robbery victim’s prior testimonial statement to investigating police, introduced during the penalty phase of a
capital case, violated the Confrontation Clause but was harmless because the state
was able to show other “overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt”); Wall v.

LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

356

1/9/2006 12:11:42 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:327

“[w]hile Crawford v. Washington fundamentally alters the way we analyze claims of error under the Confrontation Clause, the opinion
142
does not change the way we evaluate the effect of any such error.”
143
The Supreme Court in Delaware v. Van Arsdall had previously prescribed various factors the reviewing court should apply, among
others, in order to determine harmlessness regarding Confrontation
Clause violations:
[T]he constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause
errors, is subject to Chapman harmless-error analysis. The correct
inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the
cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might
nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing
courts. These factors include the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was
cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the

State, 143 S.W.3d 846, 851–53 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that an assault victim’s excited utterance to police at the hospital and in response to questioning was
testimonial, and that its admission was a violation of the Confrontation Clause, but
the error in admitting it was harmless because other “lawfully admitted evidence
overwhelmingly prove[d] the defendant’s guilt”).
In other cases, courts found Crawford errors harmful. See, e.g., People v. Pirwani,
14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 688–89 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the victim’s videotaped
statement to police regarding the loss of money was testimonial and that admitting it
was harmful error because the statement contributed to evidence of guilt); People v.
Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 264 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a child sexual assault victim’s videotaped statement in a police interview was testimonial, a significant part of
the case rather than corroborative, and that admitting it was harmful error); People
v. Shepherd, 689 N.W.2d 721, 727 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (determining it “not at all
clear” that a jury would have returned a guilty verdict absent the erroneous introduction of an accomplice-boyfriend’s testimonial plea allocution, thus making the
admission harmful error); State v. Johnson, 98 P.3d 998, 1007 (N.M. 2004) (holding
that the introduction of a robbery eyewitness’ custodial police interview violated the
Confrontation Clause and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the
robbery conviction); State v. Morton, 601 S.E.2d 873, 876 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (finding an accomplice’s custodial statement to police was testimonial and its admission at
trial was both erroneous and harmful); Lee v. State, 143 S.W.3d 565, 570–71 (Tex.
App. 2004) (holding that the roadside testimonial statement of a passenger of the
defendant to an officer was erroneously admitted and harmful because of the “reasonable likelihood” that its admission affected the jury’s deliberations).
142
T.P. v. State, No. CR-03-0574, 2004 WL 2418045, at *5 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 29,
2004).
143
475 U.S. 673 (1986).
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extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course,
144
the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.

Post-Crawford decisions have continued to apply Van Arsdall’s factors
145
in resolving harmless error issues under the Confrontation Clause.
III. CONTROVERSIAL AFTERMATH IN THE WAKE OF CRAWFORD’S
CONFRONTATION “RE-INTERPRETATION”
Three important and problematic issues remain to be addressed
in the wake of Crawford’s new and revolutionary interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause as it relates to testimonial hearsay. They are:
 What hearsay is testimonial and subject to the dictates of
the Crawford opinion?
 Should Crawford’s rule be applied retroactively?
 To what extent, if any, does the Confrontation Clause
regulate the introduction of “non-testimonial” hearsay?
In the immediate post-Crawford period, many courts attempted to address these questions and in doing so produced significant
disagreement and controversy. The balance of this Article examines
each of these concerns in turn.
A. What is “Testimonial Hearsay?”
Though the Crawford Court held unequivocally that, where a
prosecutor seeks to introduce “testimonial” hearsay against an accused, the Confrontation Clause requires that the declarant be
unavailable and that the accused have had a prior, meaningful opportunity to cross-examine that declarant, the Court declined to
define the scope of hearsay that would be considered testimonial.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, declared: “We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of
146
‘testimonial.’”
In doing so, the Court was aware that its failure to
adopt such a definition would lead to uncertainty in the lower courts
but concluded that such confusion resulting from unpredictability
147
Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia had
would not be permanent.
been alone in the White case advocating the rejection of the Roberts
144

Id. at 684.
There is an excellent discussion of Van Arsdall’s applicability in Johnson, 98 P.3d
at 1002–04. See also Cox, 876 So. 2d at 939; Wall, 143 S.W.3d at 852.
146
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). At oral argument, much of
petitioner’s argument was interrupted by numerous questions from the justices as to
the scope of the term “testimonial.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–23, Crawford,
541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 22705281.
147
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 n.10.
145
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test in favor of the testimonial test, but would have limited the classification to a “discrete” category of “formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony or confessions,” which
were historically abused by prosecutors and constituted the principal
148
In the majority
evil the Confrontation Clause sought to prevent.
opinion in Crawford, Justices Scalia and Thomas were joined by five
149
colleagues.
It is plausible that these new adherents to the testimonial approach would not have joined the majority unless the scope of
the classification of hearsay as “testimonial” was expanded from the
limited and “discrete” category previously posited by Justices Thomas
150
and Scalia.
The Crawford Court provided some direction to guide courts in
their struggle to apply the term “testimonial hearsay” to specific hearsay statements. First, the Court noted that the Clause applies to
“witnesses” against the accused and that a “witness” is, according to
151
an 1828 dictionary, one who bears testimony. Quoting that same
dictionary, the Court stated, “‘Testimony’ in turn, is typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing
152
or proving some fact.’” The Court then drew a distinction between
casual remarks and more formal statements: “An accuser who makes
a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense
that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does
153
not.”
The Court also emphasized, without adopting, some formulations of testimonial statements that have been suggested: (1) the
petitioner’s contention that testimonial hearsay should include “ex
parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutori154
ally”; (2) Justices Thomas and Scalia’s view espoused in White about

148

White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
149
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 37, 70 (listing Justice Scalia as delivering the Court’s opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
150
It is also plausible that in order to maintain the seven-member majority the
Court needed to leave the question open as to the continued viability of the Roberts
test when applied to non-testimonial evidence. See infra section III.C. (discussing
non-testimonial evidence after Crawford).
151
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
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including “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony or
155
confessions’”; and (3) the position taken in an amicus brief filed by
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, which would
include “‘statements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness to believe that the statement would be
156
available for use at a later trial.’”
The Court concluded that any categorization of testimonial
hearsay would include statements taken by police officers in the
course of interrogations, observing that “[p]olice interrogations bear
a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in
England. The statements are not sworn testimony, but the absence of
157
oath [is] not dispositive.”
The Court further stated, “even if the
Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay,
that is its primary object, and interrogations by law enforcement offi158
cers fall squarely within that class.” Here again, the Court declined
155

Id. at 51–52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
Id. at 52 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers et al. in Support of Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No.029410), 2003 WL 21754961). This view was also advanced in the amicus brief filed by
an impressive array of law professors: Sherman J. Clark (University of Michigan Law
School), James J. Duane (Regent University School of Law), Richard D. Friedman
(University of Michigan Law School), Norman Garland (Southwestern University
School of Law), Gary M. Maveal (University of Detroit Mercy School of Law), Bridget
McCormack (University of Michigan Law School), David A. Moran (Wayne State University Law School), Christopher B. Mueller (University of Colorado School of Law),
and Roger C. Park (Hastings College of Law, University of California). Brief Amicus
Curiae of Law Professors Sherman J. Clark et al. in Support of Petitioner at 1, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754958. This brief suggests that a
statement is “testimonial” when “made with reasonable anticipation of evidentiary
use.” Id. at 13. The amici further elaborated as follows:
Just as in this case, the question of whether a given statement should
be considered testimonial can usually be rather easily resolved, as indicated by the following “rules of thumb,” . . . . [1] A statement made
knowingly to the authorities that describes criminal activity is almost
always testimonial. [2] A statement made by a person claiming to be
the victim of a crime and describing the crime is usually testimonial,
whether made directly to the authorities or not. [3] If, in the case of a
crime committed over a short period of time, a statement is made before the crime is committed, it almost certainly is not testimonial. [4]
A statement made by one participant in a criminal enterprise to another, intended to further the enterprise, is not testimonial. [5] And
neither is a statement made in the course of going about one’s ordinary business, made before the criminal act has occurred or with no
recognition that it relates to criminal activity.
Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
157
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
158
Id. at 53.
156
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to provide a definition—in this case of the term “interrogation” as
used to classify testimonial hearsay—but did note that it used the
159
term “in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense.”
Therefore, Sylvia Crawford’s taped statement to police officers, obtained during their interrogation of her, clearly qualified. Justice
Stevens, dissenting in a case decided weeks after Crawford, opined
that questioning pursuant to a Terry investigative stop and the responses “[s]urely . . . qualifies as an interrogation and it follows that
160
It is likely
responses to such questions are testimonial in nature.”
that certain conversations with police officers would clearly not meet
161
even the colloquial use of the term interrogation.
As will be seen,
however, the issue as to when questioning by police qualifies as “interrogation,” in the colloquial sense, that is, when statements made to
police amount to “testimony,” has and will likely remain for some
time a matter of substantial controversy.
The Court may have deemed its description of views regarding
the critical classification of hearsay as testimonial to be helpful, but
within these formulations uncertainty abounds. Even at oral argument, some of this uncertainty was revealed. Could statements made
to nongovernmental officers be testimonial if the declarant had a
162
reasonable expectation that they would have evidentiary use?
Why
is the intent of the declarant always critical in classifying his or her
159

Id. at 53 n.4 (“Just as various definitions of ‘testimonial’ exist, one can imagine
various definitions of ‘interrogation,’ and we need not select among them in this
case. Sylvia’s recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police
questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition.”).
160
Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 195 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing actions associated with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
161
A conversation with law enforcement officers that is not the product of police
interrogation and made without any expectation by the declarant of evidentiary use
would not qualify as testimonial. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 151 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Tex.
App. 2004) (holding that statements made by a visibly upset owner of a car that had
been wrecked and abandoned were not testimonial when the owner approached investigating officers inquiring about the status of her car and its occupants, and the
officers were simply answering her questions and determining why she was upset).
162
The uncertainty is apparent in this interchange:
QUESTION: Would there be anything that fit in your category where
the person to whom the statement is made is not an officer, either a
police officer or prosecutor?
MR. FISHER: I think there may be, and the reason—I think there may
be a—a rare, rare case, Justice Ginsburg, in a scenario—you know,
come up with hypotheticals. One possible scenario might be somebody
giving a statement to their friend and directing them to tell the police.
So, you know, simply using an intermediary where we know the statement is going to the police, but—
Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL
22705281.
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statement as testimonial?
If an undercover agent or confidential
informant is used to obtain statements from declarants having no ex164
pectation of evidentiary use, are such statements testimonial?

163

The Court challenged petitioner’s counsel on this point as follows:
QUESTION: Why—why should it depend on the intent of the declarant? I—why is that—why does that make the declarant a witness
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause? I mean, suppose—
suppose the police get—get the statement from the declarant surreptitiously. They do not let—let him know that they are, in fact, the police.
That—that would disqualify it under the law professors’ test from being
testimony?
MR. FISHER: Well, in that—
QUESTION: Because he would not know that this was going to be used
in court.
MR. FISHER: Well, I mean, I think that’s a situation—you know, and
this is where the definitional problem gets difficult. I mean, because
the other part of the Confrontation Clause is a limitation on State
power, and it says—you know, going all the way [to] Blackstone, it’s a
limitation on the State molding statements that it’s going to use later in
a criminal investigation. So if that kind of a situation were present
where somebody is molding somebody’s statement, I think that might
be something the Confrontation Clause is concerned with as well.
....
QUESTION: Are you—just—just with the dialogue with Justice Scalia,
because I'm interested in the same problem, is it the intent of the
speaker or the intent of the person taking the statement that would
be—be more relevant in your view?
....
MR. FISHER: I see, Your Honor. I think that proper—the proper test
would be if—if one of the two people is so—you know, is doing something with the purpose of understanding it’s going to be used in a
criminal case, then we have a testimonial situation. I think you—this
Court could say that, but it—you have to look back—
QUESTION: You mean even the speaker or the person taking the
statement. Is that what you’re saying? I don’t understand your response.
MR. FISHER: I think certainly the speaker and I think there may be
situations—and this is—this is something the Court can deal with about
when this—about when the—when the governmental officer is the only
one and—and is under such a circumstance that the governmental officer is molding the statement in such a way and molding what
somebody is going to say—
Id. at 11–13.
164
The Court raised this question as follows:
QUESTION: It’s your view that a co-conspirator statement is not testimonial then?
MR. FISHER: I think that’s the ordinary course of events. Yes, Justice
Ginsburg.
QUESTION: Well, why is that if it meets the test of a statement made to
the police?
MR. FISHER: Well, if there’s an undercover officer present, it meets—
it meets the—the—you know, the test of a statement made to the po-
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Where statements are recorded by police using a wiretap, are they
165
testimonial?
Respondent, reflecting in oral argument upon the uncertainty of
formulations regarding the classification of hearsay as testimony, indicated that whatever definition or test the Court might announce,
[It] is going to have problems. The bugs are going to have to be
worked out. It’ll take years of—of cases, and the—and the reality
is—and I, of course, mean no disrespect to any judge—anytime
you get—you have a judge making a discretionary decision, on
the same set of facts there’s simply going to be some judges that
will make exactly opposite decisions based upon the same set of
166
facts. That’s just human nature.

Post-Crawford cases confirm this prediction.
A flurry of decisions since Crawford have dealt with the questions
posed in oral argument and have struggled with many more. A survey of cases that have grappled with the questions left unanswered in
Crawford may in some instances afford enlightenment, while others
reveal the extent of the confusion. In one of the earliest decisions
grappling with the unanswered questions of Crawford in regard to 911
calls, one judge advanced Chief Justice Rehnquist’s criticism of the
Crawford majority for failing to provide needed guidance, stating:
The case of Octivio Moscat presently before this Court demonstrates that the Chief Justice’s comments are apt. If anything they
are understated. There are thousands of homicide and assault
cases every year where a 911 call for help made by the victim to
the police is an important piece of evidence. Are such calls testimonial in nature, or not?
Do they constitute “police
interrogation” (because the caller answers questions posed by the
police operator), or not? May they be admitted into evidence
under various traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule? Or
would their admission violate the Sixth Amendment? The Crawford decision is rich in detail about the law of England in the 16th,
17th and 18th centuries, but—as the Chief Justice points out—it

lice. But then I think this is where the law professors have it right, and
this is where I’m agreeing with Justice Breyer.
Id. at 15.
165
This interesting question led to the following brief exchange:
QUESTION: Well, how—how about a wire tap? You’ve got a wire tap
going, and you hear co-conspirators on—on the other end of the wire.
Is that testimonial or not?
MR. FISHER: I think that’s the traditional kind of co-conspirator
statement that is not covered by the testimonial approach. . . .
Id. at 16.
166
Id. at 52.
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fails to give urgently needed guidance as to how to apply the Sixth
167
Amendment right now, in the 21st century.

Interestingly, a New York Times column indicated that this judge may
have actually relished the task of entering the fray and even made up a
168
fictitious case to do so.
In a number of situations, courts have not had any apparent difficulty in gleaning, from the Crawford opinion, the appropriate
classification of statements as “testimonial” or “non-testimonial.” For
example, courts have generally agreed on rulings regarding state169
ments made to third parties unconnected to law enforcement,
170
statements made during custodial or structured interrogations,
statements made during a plea allocution or during testimony given
171
in court proceedings, statements made by co-conspirators in the
172
173
course of the conspiracy, and dying declarations.
Surprisingly,
controversy has arisen regarding the classification of sworn affidavits
174
Predictably, confusion and disagreement has reand certificates.
175
sulted in attempts to classify statements made during 911 calls,
176
statements made to first responders, statements made to police dur177
ing field investigations, and children’s statements of abuse to child

167

People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877–78 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
The article includes the following remarkable assertions:
There was a problem, however, with the decision rendered by Judge
Greenberg in People v. Moscat. None of the assumptions the judge
based his opinion on were actually fact. The person captured on the
tape in that particular case was, it turned out, a neighbor, not the victim. The call had been made some nine hours after the alleged assault,
not while it was happening. And prosecutors eventually abandoned
the case.
Defense lawyers and prosecutors alike say the judge was simply eager
to be one of the first to interpret the Supreme Court’s ruling, a way to
get attention in the legal world. The judge says that prosecutors told
him the victim was on the tape, an assertion that prosecutors deny. He
says he is comfortable with the heart of his decision.
Sabrina Tavernise, Legal Precedent Doesn’t Let Facts Stand in the Way, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2004, at A1.
169
See infra notes 179–94 and accompanying text.
170
See infra notes 202–05 and accompanying text.
171
See infra notes 206–09 and accompanying text.
172
See infra notes 210–22 and accompanying text.
173
See infra notes 223–31 and accompanying text.
174
See infra notes 232–75 and accompanying text.
175
See infra notes 276–325 and accompanying text.
176
See infra notes 326–81 and accompanying text.
177
See infra notes 382–87 and accompanying text.
168
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178

protective agents or doctors.
We turn now to a review of postCrawford jurisprudence regarding each of these situations.
1.

Statements Made to Persons Not Connected to Law
Enforcement

As revealed below, statements made by children, adult victims,
and witnesses to persons unconnected to law enforcement have consistently been found to be non-testimonial and unaffected by
Crawford. Statements made by children to—or overheard by—parents
provide the first examples of statements made to persons not connected to law enforcement but which prosecutors may later wish to
use. Where there was no indication that the child reasonably contemplated any evidentiary use of his or her statement of abuse and
the statement was made to persons unconnected to law enforcement,
courts, with rare dissension, have concluded that the statements were
179
One court, classifying such statements to par“non-testimonial.”
ents as non-testimonial, rejected the argument that they should be
deemed testimonial since the parents, in questioning the ten-year-old
molestation victim, suspected some “illegal or nefarious” activity, were
engaged in “investigating” that suspicion, and turned over the fruit of
180
their investigation to police.
178

See infra notes 181–89, 196–200 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (reasoning that “testimonial” evidence would not include spontaneous statements made
by a child to her mother while being dressed, nor statements the child made to her
father a few minutes later); Somervell v. State, 883 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (considering as non-testimonial statements of abuse that the mother of an autistic child heard while the child was pretending to talk to the accused on the
phone); State v. Doe, 103 P.3d 967, 972–73 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a
four-year-old’s statements to her mother and other relatives fell within the state’s excited utterance exception to hearsay and were thus not testimonial, and also
affirming the lower court’s admission of statements made to a doctor by both the
child and her mother as non-testimonial); State v. Bobadilla, 690 N.W.2d 345, 350–51
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming the admission of a statement made to a mother by
her three-year-old child regarding abuse, reasoning that the mother’s questions arose
from her concern for the child’s health and not in anticipation of a case against defendant); State v. Brigman, 615 S.E.2d 21 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (finding a six-year-old
victim’s statement to his foster mother describing acts of sexual abuse by his mother
were non-testimonial). Compare In re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183, 189 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004) (holding a seven-year-old’s statements to her mother were non-testimonial)
and People v. R.F., 825 N.E.2d 287, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding a three-year-old
sexual abuse victim’s statement to mother and grandmother were non-testimonial)
with In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1035–36 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding accusatory
statements made by a child to a grandmother about abuse allegedly occurring more
than a year earlier to be testimonial, even though not made to a governmental official, and erroneously admitted at trial).
180
Purvis v. State, 829 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
179

LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

2006]

1/9/2006 12:11:42 PM

CONFRONTATION AFTER CRAWFORD

365

Other instances involve statements to physicians. In one case, a
four-year-old victim’s statement to an emergency room physician,
admissible under the exception for statements made for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment, was found not to be “testimonial,”
with the court explaining as follows:
We believe on the facts of this case that the victim’s statement to
the doctor was not a “testimonial” statement under [Crawford]. As
discussed above, the victim’s identification of Vaught as the perpetrator was a statement made for the purpose of medical
diagnosis or treatment. In the present case, the victim was taken
to the hospital by her family to be examined and the only evidence regarding the purpose of the medical examination,
including the information regarding the cause of the symptoms,
was to obtain medical treatment. There was no indication of a
purpose to develop testimony for trial, nor was there an indication of government involvement in the initiation or course of the
181
examination.

Similarly, a fifteen-year-old abuse victim’s statement to an emergency
room doctor was determined to be non-testimonial since the doctor
was “not performing any function remotely resembling that of a Tudor, Stuart or Hanoverian justice of the peace” and there was no
government involvement except the duty that would apply to any person having knowledge relating to a crime to furnish that information
182
to the police.
Statements describing abuse, related by children to medical personnel who are not acting in concert with police and who have no
governmental obligation to investigate abuse offenses, have been
generally denominated as non-testimonial even where these practitioners may specialize in diagnosing child abuse, regularly preserve
183
their interviews, and relay interview contents to appropriate law en-

181

State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 291 (Neb. 2004).
People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 854–55 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Crawford
v. Washington, 514 U.S. 36, 43 (2004)) (referring to Crawford’s discussion of the role
of justices of the peace in English common law). See also State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d
1262, 1269 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding a twenty-nine-month-old’s statement to a
treating family physician stating that the child’s mother’s boyfriend hit him—which
contradicted an earlier statement to an emergency room doctor to the effect that he
fell down stairs—was admissible as a statement for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment and non-testimonial because the physician was not a government official and
the defendant was not then a suspect).
183
State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (finding child’s
statement to a nurse practitioner employed by a children’s research center specializing in diagnosing abuse was non-testimonial, even though this practitioner was
clearly aware her examinations might be used in a criminal case).
182
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185

forcement authorities.
However, in In re T.T., an Illinois appellate court found that statements of a seven-year-old sexual abuse
victim to a doctor, a pediatrician and chair of the Cook County Hospital division of child protective services, were non-testimonial to the
extent that the child’s statements responded to questions regarding
the nature of the assault, described pain and injury, and aided the
physical examination (thus qualifying under the medical treatment
186
But, to the extent that the doctor elicited “achearsay exception).
cusatorial” statements regarding fault and identity of the perpetrator,
187
they were testimonial and governed by Crawford. The court emphasized that the fact that a Department of Children and Family Services
agent engaged in a “prosecutorial” investigative role in regard to the
sexual abuse had referred the child to the doctor “for medical evalua188
In emphasizing
tion of alleged sexual abuse” was not controlling.
this point, the court seemed to justify the admission of the nontestimonial portion of the statement, rather than explaining the re189
However, if such referral is not
jection of the testimonial portion.
“controlling” in the latter instance, this case is authority for the
proposition that “accusatorial” statements by children to physicians,
unconnected to law enforcement, can be testimonial.
Adult victim and other adult statements to relatives, friends, accomplices, co-conspirators and others unconnected with law
190
enforcement have likewise been found to be non-testimonial, but
184

Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 855 (“After all, anyone who obtains information relevant to a criminal investigation might (and certainly should) pass it along [to] the
police.”).
185
815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
186
Id. at 804.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 803 (“We also find unpersuasive respondent’s assertion that the relationship between DCFS and Dr. Lorand at the time of the examination indicated that she
constructively acted as the government’s agent in interrogating G.F.”).
189
Id. at 804. See also People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (applying T.T.’s rationale to a rape victim’s statement to an emergency room nurse and
physician and excluding as testimonial under Crawford that portion of her statements
concerning fault and identity).
190
Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d. 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2004) (avoiding the need for
determining the retroactive application of Crawford in post-conviction proceedings by
declaring entries of threats and abuse contained in the diary of a domestic homicide
victim non-testimonial since the entries were not made with the expectation that they
would be used at a trial); Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding a
homicide accomplice’s private conversation with a friend, made shortly before the
killings and which related to one of the victims, to be non-testimonial and outside
the scope of Crawford); State v. Smith, 881 A.2d 160, 172–74 (Conn. 2005) (holding
that a murder victim’s state-of-mind statement to her mother that the defendant “was
going to kill me” was non-testimonial); State v. Jones, No. 9911016309, 2004 WL
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courts have yet to confront the situation, discussed in oral argument
in Crawford, of a declarant communicating with a relative, friend, or
other person unconnected to law enforcement with the expressed intention that the communication be relayed by that individual to law enforcement

2914276, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2004) (deciding that statements made by the
defendant to his girlfriend of his plan to murder another were not testimonial under
Crawford, since he was not revealing his plan to a judge or policeman, but was simply
bragging about it to his lover); State v. Leonard, 910 So. 2d 977, 987 (La. Ct. App.
2005) (classifying a victim’s statement to his girlfriend, admissible under the Existing
State of Mind hearsay exception, as non-testimonial); State v. Heggar, 908 So. 2d
1245, 1248 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that a murder victim’s present sense utterances made to a friend (former lover) during a telephone conversation
immediately prior to the killing were non-testimonial); People v. Shepherd, 689
N.W.2d 721, 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that jailhouse statements the defendant’s boyfriend made to visiting relatives, overheard by a guard, to be “clearly” nontestimonial, reasoning that “[e]ven under the broadest definition of testimonial, it is
unlikely that Mr. Butters would have reasonably believed that the statements would
be available for use at a later trial”); State v. Blackstock, 598 S.E.2d 412, 420 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2004) (finding that an adult victim’s hospital conversations about the cause of
his injuries, made to his wife and daughter over a period of several days, were nontestimonial because there were no circumstances indicating that the victim had a reasonable expectation that they would be used prosecutorially); Miller v. State, 98 P.3d
738, 744 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (ruling that a co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant and made to fellow inmates while incarcerated was not testimonial
under Crawford, since “[i]t was not admitted through affidavit, a formalized deposition, and was not a confession resulting from a custodial interrogation,” but holding
it improperly admitted in contravention of the Confrontation Clause nonetheless
after finding the statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability under the former
Roberts reliability approach to non-testimonial evidence); Texas v. Woods, 152 S.W.3d
105, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding a homicide co-defendant’s casual “street
corner” statements to acquaintances both before and shortly after the murder to be
non-testimonial, thus making the rules articulated in Crawford inapplicable); State v.
Wilkinson, 879 A.2d 445, 447 (Vt. 2005) (finding an aggravated assault victim’s excited utterance to his cousin non-testimonial); State v. Orndorff, 95 P.3d 406, 407–08
(Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (finding one adult victim’s excited utterance immediately after a home invasion was not testimonial, and explaining that the utterance fit into
none of the categories described in Crawford and “[i]t was not a declaration or affirmation made to establish or prove some fact; it was not prior testimony; and [the
declarant] had no reason to expect that her statement would be used prosecutorially”); State v. Ferguson, 607 S.E.2d 526, 528–29 (W. Va. 2004) (finding a murder
victim’s “excited utterances” to friends were not testimonial, and refusing to extend
“Crawford’s largely unexplored ban on ‘testimonial hearsay’ that has not been tested
by cross-examination” to statements made separate from any official investigation to
“non-official and non-investigational witnesses”); State v. Manuel, 697 N.W.2d 811,
824 (Wis. 2005) (ruling that a homicide eyewitness’ spontaneous statement to his
girlfriend in a private conversation without any expectation that she would relay it to
police was non-testimonial); State v. Manuel, 685 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Wis. Ct. App.
2004) (finding non-testimonial a statement an eyewitness to a homicide made to his
girlfriend, describing the incident that had just occurred, because it fell within the
state’s “statement of recent perception” hearsay exception, which required that the
statement not be made in contemplation or anticipation of litigation).
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191

for evidentiary use.
Statements made under such circumstances may
very likely be classified as testimonial by courts in the future. However, it does appear that something other than simply a victim’s
disclosure of a brutal attack and a plea for help to a stranger will be
needed to make that stranger an “agent” of the police and the victim’s statement “testimonial,” even though the stranger subsequently
192
relays that information to the police.
193
In Hammond v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals found a murder accomplice’s statement against interest implicating himself and the defendant, made to his girlfriend soon after
the killing, to be non-testimonial under Crawford since the statements
were “not elicited during structured police interrogation or given by
194
the declarant to any law enforcement officer.”
Even though the person eliciting a structured statement is not
classified as a member of law enforcement, if he or she has an independent legal obligation to investigate (not just report) criminal
activity—such as child abuse—or the person’s special abilities are utilized by law enforcement to facilitate an investigation, most courts
195
have treated such statements as testimonial.
Astonishingly, some
191

See supra note 162 (recounting discussion of this question during oral argument in Crawford).
192
West, 823 N.E.2d at 91–92 (distinguishing as non-testimonial statements made
to a 911 dispatcher for the purposes of securing help and as testimonial statements
to the dispatcher describing the direction in which the assailants fled and the property they took).
193
880 A.2d 1066 (D.C. 2005).
194
Id. at 1100.
195
For example, one court classified as testimonial a child sexual abuse victim’s
statement to a Department of Children and Family Services agent (who had a legal
obligation to investigate reports of abuse) and who was working in cooperation with
law enforcement. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 800 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). The court
commented that, because “child abuse has both criminal and social welfare implications, DCFS and the State’s Attorney may naturally share some involvement in a
particular case,” and held that “where DCFS works at the behest of and in tandem
with the State’s Attorney with the intent and purpose of assisting in the prosecutorial
effort, DCFS functions as an agent of the prosecution.” Id. at 801. See also United
States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 556 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding as testimonial statements made by a child to a “forensic interviewer” referred by governmental officials
and prior to the child being examined by a doctor, when two video recordings of the
session were made consistent with the regular protocol, one was retained by the center employing the interviewer, and the other was delivered to law enforcement);
People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 756–57 (Ct. App. 2004) (ruling a four-yearold child sexual assault victim’s statement was testimonial where the police utilized
the service of the county’s Multidisciplinary Interview Center, a facility “specially designed and staffed for interviewing children suspected of being victims of child
abuse,” and the interview session, conducted by a forensic interview specialist, who
was not a government employee, was personally monitored by a deputy district attor-
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196

courts reached a contrary conclusion by exaggerating and distorting one of the illustrative formulations for determining whether a
statement is testimonial (which was identified but not adopted in
Crawford), that is, “pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,” and virtually ignoring the
197
One court in Ohio, for example, has held that statements
others.
made by a rape victim to a nurse, in a “specialized healthcare facility
designed to provide expert care to victims of violent sexual assault,”
were not testimonial, despite the investigating officer having taken
the victim to the unit for treatment and remaining present during
198
the interview
A Minnesota court similarly held that a seven-year-old childmolestation victim’s videotaped statement to a nurse practitioner with
the Midwest Children’s Resource Center (MCRC) was not testimonial
even though an investigating detective and child-protection worker
ney and his investigator); In re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183, 188 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(finding that a child abuse victim’s statements were testimonial because they were
made to an agent of a child advocacy center in an interview one week after the incident with a detective observing the interview through a two-way mirror); State v.
Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 325 (Md. 2005) (determining that statements of two child
sexual abuse victim, ages eight and ten, were testimonial when elicited by a sexual
abuse investigator of the Department of Health and Human Services during a structured interview conducted at the request of—and in the presence of—the
investigating police officer); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or. 2004) (holding
that a three-year-old child’s statement, in a child murder prosecution, was testimonial where police had asked a Department of Human Services caseworker to conduct
the interviews that produced the statements and the police were present and videotaped the sessions).
196
State v. Karsky, 696 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); In re D.L., No. 84643,
2005 WL 1119809 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12, 2005); State v. Stahl, No. 22261, 2005 WL
602687, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2005); State v. Lee, No. 22262, 2005 WL
544837 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2005).
197
See supra notes 154–56 for a description of these formulations.
198
Stahl, 2005 WL 602687, at *4. Though the officer, who had previously interviewed the victim and obtained a statement, did not participate in the interview, a
complete description of the assault was elicited for various purposes, including facilitating the collection of physical evidence consisting of photographs, swabs, dental
floss, fingernail scrapings, hair samples, and descriptions of bruises. Id. at *6. The
victim, prior to the interview, signed a form authorizing release of evidence “to a law
enforcement agency for use only in the investigation and prosecution of this crime.”
Id. The court, though, took note that the form made no reference to statements
made during the examination, id. at *7, and that the victim “could have reasonably
believed that she was at DOVE for the purpose of providing physical evidence, without necessarily understanding that she was also providing testimonial evidence.” Id.
at *6. Stahl expanded upon a very similar decision reached by that court one week
earlier, Lee, 2005 WL 544837. The only material difference between the two cases
was that no law enforcement officer was present during the interview in the Lee case.
For another Ohio case arriving at the same conclusion on similar facts, see In re D.L.,
2005 WL 1119809.
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referred the child to the nurse for the purpose of being interviewed
199
and the detective observed the interview from another room. Justifying its conclusion, the court stated:
Here, although the MCRC examination may have been arranged
by Detective Manuel and a child-protection worker, there is no
indication that T.L.K. thought that her statements might be used
in a later trial. T.L.K. was driven to MCRC by her foster mother,
and she was shielded from the police presence throughout the
MCRC examination. The record is clear that Detective Manuel
did not interrupt or direct any portion of the interview or examination. The length of time between the alleged abuse and the
examination also suggests that T.L.K. was not aware of any prosecutorial purpose of the examination and did not “reasonably
believe that her disclosures would be available for use at a later
200
trial.”

Apparently, the ability of the officer and others to disguise the evidentiary purpose of the interview from a seven-year-old child was
controlling. The court concluded that the defendant failed to meet
his burden of showing that “‘the circumstances surrounding the contested statements led [the child] to reasonably believe her disclosures
would be available for use at a later trial or, that the circumstances
201
would lead a reasonable child of her age to have that expectation.’”
2.

Statements Made During Custodial or Structured
Interrogations

It is certainly not surprising that courts dealing with cases involving interrogations closely resembling Sylvia’s interrogation in
Crawford faithfully classify them as testimonial. Statements elicited
from accomplices or co-conspirators, during police interrogations,
202
are easily classified as testimonial.
A formal voluntary statement of
an eyewitness to a murder, which was reduced to writing, signed, and

199

Karsky, 696 N.W.2d at 819.
Id. at 820 (quoting State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. Ct. App.
2005)).
201
Id. at 820 (quoting Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d at 396).
202
See, e.g., State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 932, 938 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (declaring coconspirator’s statement during police interrogation “falls squarely within the reach
of Crawford”); State v. Morton, 601 S.E.2d. 873, 875–76 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
statements made in an interview at the sheriff’s office after Miranda rights were given
to be testimonial); State v. Carter, No. 84036, 2004 WL 2914921, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 16, 2004) (finding codefendant’s statement during police interrogation to
be testimonial). See also Hernandez v. State, 875 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (ruling statements of co-defendant after arrest during a police-controlled
phone call with the defendant were testimonial).
200
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given at the police station, was also determined to be testimonial.
The tape-recorded statements of two eyewitnesses to an assault, which
were reduced to seventeen pages of transcript, were the product of
structured police questioning and thus qualified as testimonial under
204
any “conceivable definition” of the term “testimonial.” A child sexual abuse victim’s tape-recorded statement that was the product of
police questioning and was made during a “classic station-house interview” was found to be “indistinguishable” from Sylvia’s statement
in Crawford notwithstanding that Sylvia was in custody and this victim
205
was not.
3.

Statements Made During a Plea Allocution or During
Testimony Given in Court Proceedings

The Supreme Court in Crawford stated that the “unpardonable
vice of the Roberts test” was its capacity to admit “core testimonial
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to ex206
clude.”
Demonstrating this fact, the court cited numerous cases
admitting under the Roberts test “plainly testimonial statements,” specifically noting that these included cases involving plea allocutions,
207
Courts, after Crawgrand jury testimony, and prior trial testimony.
ford, have not engaged in this “vice.” Post-Crawford cases have
208
classified plea allocutions and grand jury testimony as testimonial.
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court applied Crawford to prelimi209
nary hearing testimony.
203

Samaron v. State, 150 S.W.3d 701, 707 (Tex. App. 2004) (noting that the
statement was written and signed after being questioned by police rather than a
spontaneous statement about what had happened).
204
People v. Lee, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 309, 314 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a tape
recorded police interrogation filling seventeen pages of transcript certainly qualifies
as testimonial “under any conceivable definition” (quoting Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 52 n.4 (2004))).
205
People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 854 (Ct. App. 2004).
206
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
207
Id. at 64–65.
208
United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 78 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding “no question”
that plea allocutions and grand jury testimony are testimonial statements under
Crawford); United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding a plea
allocution testimonial “as it is formally given in court, under oath, and in response to
questions by the court or the prosecutor”); People v. Shepherd, 689 N.W.2d 721, 721
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling transcript of guilty plea to subornation of perjury by
defendant’s boyfriend was testimonial and wrongly admitted); People v. Hardy, 824
N.E.2d 953, 955 (N.Y. 2005) (finding use of redacted transcript of co-defendant’s
plea allocution reversible error).
209
People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004) (finding, en banc, that the opportunity
to cross-examine the subsequently unavailable declarant, afforded to the defendant
at a preliminary hearing, did not constitute a meaningful prior opportunity to cross-
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Statements Made by Co-conspirators in the Course and
in Furtherance of the Conspiracy

Statements made by co-conspirators in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy and made to co-conspirators or others
unconnected to law enforcement appear to be clearly outside the
realm of being testimonial. Justice Scalia, speaking for the majority
in Crawford, commented that statements in furtherance of a conspir210
acy are “by their nature” not testimonial.
The declarants making
such statements have no expectation of their eventual evidentiary use
and they are not generated or elicited by the efforts of law enforcement. A Texas Court of Appeals concluded that a co-conspirator’s
pre-murder statements made to fellow conspirators in planning the
crime, and overheard by a girlfriend of one of them, did not qualify
211
The court noted that these stateas testimonial under Crawford.
ments “were not made in a setting where it might reasonably be
212
expected the statements would be used in judicial proceedings.”
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that co-conspirator statements “made to loved ones and acquaintances . . . are not the kind of
memorialized, judicial-process-created evidence of which Crawford
213
speaks” and therefore were not testimonial.
Beginning at the oral argument in Crawford, questions arose as to
whether co-conspirator statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy—but made to confidential informants or undercover law
enforcement agents who are feigning participation—would be con214
sidered testimonial. It has been advanced that where a confidential
informant is participating in the conversations producing the coconspirator statements “for the very reason of obtaining evidence”
examine since the right to cross-examine was limited at the hearing to the issue of
probable cause, and further holding that the introduction at trial of the preliminary
hearing testimony violated the defendant’s confrontation rights); State v. Stuart, 695
N.W.2d 259 (Wis. 2005) (holding preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable
witness not admissible because, for confrontation purposes, there was no meaningful
opportunity to cross-examine). But see State v. McGowen, No. M2004-00109-CCA-R3CD, 2005 WL 2008183 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2005) (finding, for confrontation
purposes, cross-examination opportunity at preliminary hearing sufficient to justify
the introduction at trial of testimony generated at the preliminary hearing when the
witness became unavailable).
210
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
211
Wiggins v. State, 152 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Tex. App. 2004). See also Bush v. State,
895 So. 2d 836, 847 (Miss. 2005) (holding that “[u]nder Roberts, Crawford, Mitchell,
and Rule [of Evidence] 803(d)(2)(E),” statements made by one co-conspirator to
another in planning a robbery were admissible).
212
Wiggins, 152 S.W.3d at 659.
213
United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004).
214
See supra note 164.
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against them, the statements so generated would fall within the rule
of Crawford and be excluded, but it appears that even these co215
conspirator statements will be classified as non-testimonial.
Consistent with the petitioner’s answer to a query on this issue
216
during oral argument in Crawford, the Second Circuit applied the
“reasonable expectation” test to answer the question of “whether [the
co-conspirator] served as a ‘witness’ who bears testimony within the
meaning of the Clause, despite the fact that he was unaware that his
statements were being elicited by law enforcement and would poten217
tially be used in a trial.”
In this case, the Second Circuit observed
that the Crawford Court had alluded to various formulations of the
reasonable expectation test and, though not adopting any of them,
the Crawford majority commented that they share a “common nucleus” and define the scope of the Confrontation Clause at “various
218
levels of abstraction.” Predicting that the Supreme Court would ultimately use the reasonable expectation test as “the anchor of a more
concrete definition of testimony,” the Second Circuit concluded that
the co-conspirator’s unwitting statements to a confidential informant
in furtherance of the conspiracy did not constitute testimony since he
had “no knowledge of the [confidential informant’s] connection to
investigators and believed that he was having a casual conversation
219
with a friend and potential co-conspirator.”
Using a different rationale, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
came to the same conclusion that a co-conspirator’s statements made
to a confidential police informant in furtherance of the conspiracy
215

United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 2005), rev’g No.
CRIM.2004-05F/R, 2004 WL 1125146 (D.V.I. May 11, 2004) (overturning a district
court decision that incorporated this analysis and found that such statements were
“testimonial,” the appellate court noted the analysis was “not without some appeal,”
but stated “the conversations reasonably could be categorized as involving statements
that [the confidential informant] expected to be used prosecutorially; obtaining evidence for the prosecution is, after all, the raison d’être of being a confidential
informant”). As to this concern being raised in oral argument, see supra note 163.
216
See supra note 162. Mr. Fisher, for the petitioner, cited the law professors who
filed an amicus brief advancing the “reasonable expectation” test for classifying
statements as testimonial. The test was described as an objective one that would ask:
“Would a reasonable person in the position of declarant anticipate that the statement would likely be used for evidentiary purposes?” Transcript of Oral Argument at
9–10, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL
22705281; Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors, supra note 156, at 20.
217
United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004). See also People v. Redeaux, 823 N.E.2d 268, 271 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (arriving at the same conclusion but
reasoning that the conspiratorial statement to the undercover agent was not the
product of “interrogation” as that term was utilized in Crawford).
218
Saget, 377 F.3d at 229.
219
Id.
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220

are not testimonial under Crawford. It justified this classification by
noting that the Crawford Court cited with approval its own previous
221
decision in Bourjaily v. United States —where admission of such a
statement was found to be proper under the Clause—and referenced
it “as an example of a case in which non-testimonial statements were
correctly admitted against the defendant despite the lack of a prior
222
opportunity for cross-examination.”
5.

Dying Declarations

The Crawford Court, though not deciding the question as to
whether “testimonial” dying declarations should be exempted from
the Crawford exclusionary rule upon historical grounds, did note that
223
It hinted that such an exsuch an exception would be sui generis.
ception might be warranted by stating, “[t]he one deviation we have
found involves dying declarations. The existence of that exception as
a general rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be disputed. Although
many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for
224
admitting even those that clearly are.”
Seizing on this, the Supreme Court of California, in a post-Crawford case, recognized such
an exception when the dying declaration was given to police respond225
The Supreme Court of
ing to the shooting of the declarant.
California did so, concluding:
[I]f, as Crawford teaches, the confrontation clause “is most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common
law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the
founding,” it follows that the common law pedigree of the exception for dying declarations poses no conflict with the Sixth
226
Amendment.

The Supreme Court of Georgia, in dicta, hinted that it might be
amenable to recognizing an exception from the Crawford rule for testimonial dying declarations by quoting at length Crawford’s footnote

220

Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 183–84.
483 U.S. 171 (1987).
222
Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 183. See also Redeaux, 823 N.E.2d at 270–71 (coconspirator statement to undercover officer in the course of and in furtherance of
the conspiracy was not the product of interrogation and was not testimonial).
223
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
224
Id. (citations omitted).
225
People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956, 971 (Cal. 2004).
226
Id. at 972 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).
221
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227

six.
Other courts found that dying declarations fall outside the
228
ambit of exclusion under the Confrontation Clause after Crawford.
Arriving at the opposite conclusion, one federal district court,
noting that the Crawford Court deliberately left the question open,
concluded that a stabbing victim’s dying declaration, elicited through
police questioning in the emergency room of a hospital, was “testi229
monial” under Crawford.
The court stated that there was “no
rationale in Crawford or otherwise under which dying declarations
230
should be treated differently than any other testimonial statement.”
Another federal district court judge, though finding a murder victim’s dying declaration admissible regardless of its testimonial nature
under the Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Doctrine, rejected the contention by the government that otherwise it should be excepted from
231
exclusion under Crawford.

227

Walton v. State, 603 S.E.2d 263, 265–66 (Ga. 2004) (discussing the unpreserved
issue of the admission of a non-testimonial dying declaration made by the declarant
to his brother).
228
For example, in State v. Martin, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a
statement by a murder victim—who had been shot in the chest and stabbed in the
neck (cutting an artery)—who told his girlfriend “Call the police. Jeff and Lenair.”
695 N.W.2d 578, 581 (Minn. 2005). The statement was made while the victim was in
a great deal of pain, choking, and clutching his chest, just an hour before he died.
Id. The court found that the severity of his injuries was sufficient to demonstrate an
awareness of the declarant of his imminent demise and thus his statement qualified
as a dying declaration. Id. at 583–84. The court additionally found the admission of
this declaration did not offend the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by Crawford
“because an exception for dying declarations existed at common law and was not repudiated by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 585–86. Similarly, in People v. Gilmore, an
Illinois appellate court found a critically wounded murder victim’s hospital statement, describing his assailant and providing specific information that would lead to
the perpetrator’s identification, made to officers who had asked if he knew who shot
him, to be a dying declaration. 828 N.E.2d 293 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). Turning to the
confrontation violation claim, the court recognized that since the declaration was the
product of police questioning for the purpose of investigating a criminal offense,
under Crawford, the statement was “testimonial.” Id. at 301–02. However, the court,
noting the dicta in Crawford’s footnote six, concluded that dying declarations were
exempted from exclusion under the Clause. Id. at 302.
229
United States v. Jordan, No. CRIM. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at *3 (D.
Colo. Mar. 3, 2005).
230
Id. (emphasizing further the inherent reliability concerns regarding dying declarations and the fact that this exception was not even recognized at the time of the
ratification of the Sixth Amendment).
231
United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965 n.5 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (citing
the inherent unreliability of such declarations as the reason they should not be exempted).
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Certifications and Affidavits

It would appear that under even the narrowest interpretation,
Crawford’s “testimonial” hearsay would include sworn affidavits and
certifications. Such an interpretation would seem apparent from the
Crawford majority’s historical examination of colonial practices in
232
admitting ex parte depositions and examinations, and the Court’s
use of the definitions of a “witness” as one who “bears testimony” and
“testimony” as “a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
233
Additionally, all of
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”
the formulations of this “core class” of “testimonial” hearsay that the
Court selected to highlight would appear to include affidavits and
certifications:
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements exist: [1] “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to crossexamine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,” [2] “extrajudicial
statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such
as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,” [3]
“statements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial.” These formulations all
share a common nucleus and then define the Clause’s coverage at
various levels of abstraction around it. Regardless of the precise
articulation, some statements qualify under any definition—for
example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing.
Statements taken by police officers in the course of interroga234
tions are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.

The Crawford Court even appeared to include unsworn—as well as
sworn—affidavits in the category of testimonial hearsay sought to be
regulated by the Clause, refuting the concurring Chief Justice’s con235
The Court stated: “We find it implausible
tention that it did not.
that a provision which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte
236
affidavit thought trial by unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly OK.”
232

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 47–49 (2004).
Id. at 51.
234
Id. at 51–52 (citations omitted).
235
Id. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“Thus, while I agree that the Framers
were mainly concerned about sworn affidavits and depositions, it does not follow that
they were similarly concerned about the Court’s broader category of testimonial
statements.”).
236
Id. at 52 n.3.
233
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Concern and disagreement has arisen since the Crawford decision as to whether the term “testimonial” would include certifications,
affidavits, or reports, sometimes authorized by law or sanctioned by
rules of evidence, whereby an official or agent of the government or
private entity makes certified statements as to whether certain procedures were followed or results obtained, or whether certain records
exist. These certifications are often prepared with the knowledge
they will be used as evidence and are often provided at the request of
law enforcement officers or prosecutors. Their use, in some cases,
provides proof essential to a successful prosecution, but courts appear
divided as to their admissibility under Crawford.
The Supreme Court of Nevada considered a driving under the
influence case in which the prosecution sought to admit into evidence an affidavit authorized by Nevada legislation and prepared by a
237
healthcare professional who drew blood from the defendant.
The
statute authorized its admission at trial to prove the identity of the
declarant, the identity of the person from whom the blood was
drawn, proper custody and control of the blood, and the identity of
238
the person who received it. Prior to trial, the trial court ordered its
exclusion upon the defendant’s assertion that its introduction would
violate his confrontation rights and the state sought mandamus to re239
The Nevada Supreme Court refused to
quire its admission at trial.
issue the writ, and declared that the affidavit, prepared pursuant to
statute and solely for the prosecution’s use at trial, was testimonial
under Crawford and could not be introduced unless the affiant was
240
made available at trial for cross-examination.
Similarly, a report prepared by an employee of a private laboratory documenting the results of a sexual assault victim’s blood test,
which had been requested by and prepared for law enforcement, was
held by a New York appeals court to have been improperly admitted
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule and over
241
the accused’s confrontation objection.
The court found that the
report of the blood test was inadmissible as a business record because
it was prepared in contemplation of litigation and therefore lacked
242
the necessary indicia of reliability. In finding a Crawford violation of
the defendant’s confrontation rights, the court explained: “Because
237
238
239
240
241
242

City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591, 595 (Nev. 2004).
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (App. Div. 2004).
Id. at 396–97.
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the test was initiated by the prosecution and generated by the desire
to discover evidence against defendant, the results were testimo243
nial.”
In contrast, a Texas Court of Appeals decision ruled that an autopsy report, prepared by a now-deceased medical examiner, and
admitted in a murder prosecution under the public records hearsay
244
After concluding that a medical
exception, was “non-testimonial.”
examiner was not “other law enforcement personnel,” the court
found his report was not excluded from the public records exception.
Further, because, in part, it was an “objective, routine, scientific determination of an unambiguous factual nature” and prepared by one
who did not have a motive to fabricate, it did “not fall within the
245
It is difcategories of testimonial evidence described in Crawford.”
ficult to imagine that an autopsy report, prepared by a medical
examiner, would not have been prepared with an eye toward its use
in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Since a report by a medical
examiner is not simply an objective observation of a routine nature
when it includes subjective analysis of the cause of death, it is difficult
to justify the court’s classification of such a document as nontestimonial.
Recently, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals addressed this
issue in a homicide case where the cause of death was not in dis246
pute.
This court found an autopsy report of a non-testifying
medical examiner admissible under the business records and public
records hearsay exceptions, but went on to address a Crawford challenge:
We hold that the findings in an autopsy report of the physical
condition of a decedent, which are routine, descriptive and not
analytical, which are objectively ascertained and generally reliable
and enjoy a generic indicium of reliability, may be received into
evidence without the testimony of the examiner. Where, however, contested conclusions or opinions in an autopsy report are
central to the determination of corpus delecti or criminal agency
and are offered into evidence, they serve the same function as testimony and trigger the Sixth Amendment right of
247
confrontation.

243

Id. at 397.
Moreno Denoso v. State, 156 S.W.3d 166, 180–83 (Tex. App. 2005).
245
Id. (noting also that even if the autopsy report was testimonial, the error in
admitting it was harmless).
246
Rollins v. State, 866 A.2d 926 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).
247
Id. at 950–51, 954.
244
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One judge of the Criminal Court of New York held that the
statutorily-authorized certification by an agent of the Department of
Motor Vehicles indicating that the defendant was properly noticed of
his driver license suspension, was inadmissible because it was not a
business record (not a contemporaneous entry) and because it vio248
lated confrontation rights of the defendant under Crawford.
The
court pointed out that “[p]ost Crawford, the people’s continued reliance on [the statute authorizing the certification] to permit such
affidavits of non-testifying witnesses to be received in evidence to
249
prove an element of the crime charged is simply untenable.”
250
A Florida court of appeal, in Shiver v. State, considered the admissibility of a statutorily-authorized “breath test” affidavit, prepared
by a non-testifying trooper and offered to establish an essential prerequisite to the admissibility of breathalyzer readings in DUI cases:
that required maintenance had been performed upon the breathalyzer. The court concluded that this affidavit was testimonial since it
had been prepared with a reasonable expectation that it would be
used prosecutorially—in fact the only purpose the affidavit served was
251
its use at trial.
Though the Crawford Court specifically labeled hearsay admitted
252
under the business records exception non-testimonial, modern ex248

People v. Capellan, 791 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318 (Crim. Ct. 2004). See also People v.
Pacer, 796 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (App. Div. 2005) (deciding that an “affidavit of regularity/proof of mailing” prepared by a Department of Motor Vehicles employee was
erroneously introduced to prove a necessary element of the offense charged, that the
defendant knew his driving privileges had been revoked, and concluding it was error
due to the fact that under Crawford the document was testimonial and the declarant
did not testify); People v. Niene, 798 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894 (Crim. Ct. 2005) (finding the
affidavit of an official in the Department of Consumer Affairs to the effect that no
vendor’s license had been issued by that office to the defendant was “testimonial”
and inadmissible). But see State v. N.M.K, 118 P.3d 368, 372 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding that a certification by a Department of Licensing official, stating that no license had been issued to the defendant, was non-testimonial and admissible).
249
Capellan, 791 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
250
900 So. 2d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). See also Belvin v. State, No. 4D044235, 2005 WL 1336497, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 8, 2005) (concluding also that
such a statutorily-authorized breath test affidavit was inadmissible testimonial hearsay, stating: “A breath test affidavit thus appears to fall squarely within Crawford’s
‘core class’ of ‘testimonial’ statements.”).
251
Shiver, 900 So. 2d at 618.
252
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (“Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial—for example,
business records . . . .”); see also id. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“To its credit,
the Court’s analysis of ‘testimony’ excludes at least some hearsay exceptions, such as
business records and official records.”); United States v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, 111 F.
App’x 732, 734 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding items contained in defendant’s immigration
file were non-testimonial public records under Crawford); Johnson v. Renico, 314 F.
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pansion of this exception permits its predicate—that it was made
near the time of the happening of the event by a person with knowledge of the event, that it was the routine practice of the business to
make such an entry, and that the record is what it purports to be—to
be established by certification in lieu of the testimony of a custodian
253
Obviously, since such certification will
or other qualified person.
be made in contemplation of its use in litigation and will often be
procured by law enforcement officers or prosecutors, its continued
use in criminal prosecutions is suspect under Crawford. A United
States district judge, in a case of first impression, precluded the government from introducing business records by authentication using a
254
certification authorized by Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11). Justifying this ruling, the court explained:
The statements within a certification contemplated by Rule
902(11) are testimonial statements because they contain “solemn
declaration or affirmations made for the purpose of establishing
or proving some fact,” namely that the proper foundation for the
admission of the business record exists. They are the functional
equivalent of ex parte in-court testimony that defendants cannot
cross-examine. Indeed, the Rule 902(11) procedure itself takes
the place of live, sworn testimony of a witness. Moreover, the
Rule 902(11) declarants know that they are providing foundational testimony for business records to the government, and
thus, must reasonably expect that their certifications will be used
prosecutorially. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Rule
255
902(11) procedure violates defendants’ right to confrontation.

However, in one post-Crawford decision, a court concluded, regarding similar certification provisions, that their use was non-

Supp. 2d 700, 707 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding statements contained in petitioner’s
police booking information sheets “admitted pursuant to the business records exception . . . are by their nature nontestimonial, and their admission would not violate
the holding in Crawford . . . .”).
253
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (amended in 2000 to allow proof that the record
meets the criteria by means of testimony or certification); FED. R. EVID. 902(11) (allowing proof of authenticity of a business record to be established by certification).
See also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (as amended by 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 2003–259 § 2);
MICH. R. EVID. 803(6) (amended in 2001); UTAH R. EVID. 803(6) (amended in 2001);
PA. R. EVID. 803(6) (amended in 2001).
254
United States v. Wittig, No. 03-40142JAR, 2005 WL 1227790, at *2 (D. Kan. May
23, 2005) (noting that Rule 902(11) provides that authenticity of a business record
may be established by “a written declaration of its custodian or other qualified person” to the effect that it was made contemporaneous with the event recorded by a
person with knowledge, and that it was made by and kept in the regularly conducted
activity).
255
Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
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256

testimonial and not controlled by Crawford. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, reviewing the conviction of a previously-deported alien
for reentering the United States without consent of the Attorney
General or Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, held
that admission of a Certificate of Nonexistence of Record (CNR), be257
ing non-testimonial, did not violate confrontation under Crawford.
258
Though the court cited a prior case that held the contents of an
immigration file were admissible as business records, it did not explain how this justified the admission of a CNR that was not a part of
the contents of the defendant’s immigration file, but merely an official’s certification of the results of an inspection of that file. In this
case, the official’s observation was used to establish an essential ele259
Regarding the identical issue, the Ninth
ment of the offense.
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the CNR certificate was
prepared for litigation, but added that the certification addressed the
absence of a document among “documents that were not prepared
260
Noting that this certificate did not “resemble the
for litigation.”
examples of testimonial evidence” described in Crawford, the court
261
concluded that the certificate was non-testimonial and admissible.
Other post-Crawford cases likewise concluded that certifications
or reports used in criminal prosecutions are non-testimonial under
Crawford. In a driving while intoxicated case, the New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed the decision of a trial court excluding, as
violating confrontation under Crawford, a blood alcohol report prepared by the Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD), a division of the
262
The report described the
New Mexico Department of Health.
256

United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005).
Id.
258
United States v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, 111 F. App’x 732, 734 (5th Cir. 2004).
259
Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d at 680.
260
United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2005).
261
Id. at 833.
262
State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628 (N.M. 2004). In a Massachusetts cocaine possession prosecution, a statutorily authorized certificate, admissible thereunder to
establish the composition, quality and weight of the substance, was found to be nontestimonial under Crawford. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 706 (Mass.
2005). The court, citing language in Crawford, commented:
[W]e do not believe that the admission of these certificates of analysis
implicate[s] “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed . . . particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused.” The documentary evidence at issue here has very
little kinship to the type of hearsay the confrontation clause was intended to exclude, absent an opportunity for cross-examination.
Id. (citations omitted). A similar Colorado statute authorizes admission of any report
or finding by a criminalistics laboratory in lieu of the technician thereof personally
257
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method the SLD used to test the defendant’s blood and the results of
263
Holding the exclusion to have been improper, the
that testing.
court found the report admissible under the public records exception. The court also found that since SLD employees were neither
police officers nor law enforcement personnel and their report was
neither investigative or prosecutorial nor prepared in an adversarial
264
setting, the report was non-testimonial under Crawford.
The court
further explained that although this report was made by a government officer, it was only made to ensure an accurate measurement,
265
Likewise, in
not to produce testimony for introduction at a trial.
266
Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Court of Appeals, “[g]uided
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford and the historical context in which it was rooted, as well as the reasoning of appellate
267
courts in other states,” approved the introduction, over a Confrontation Clause challenge, of an absent breathalyzer operator’s
certificate attesting to the specific blood alcohol content of the defendant’s blood and certifying that the equipment utilized was in
268
good working order.
In another driving while intoxicated case, the Court of Appeals
of Indiana considered the constitutional propriety of introducing—
over the defendant’s confrontation objection—a certificate from the
state’s Director of Toxicology regarding the required inspection and
necessary maintenance of the breath test instrument used in the
269
case.
This certificate, statutorily authorized, was introduced to estestifying to the analysis, comparison, or identification. People v. Hinojas-Mendoza,
No. 03CA0645, 2005 WL 2561391, at *3–4 (Colo. Ct. App. July 28, 2005). Regarding
the introduction in this case of such a report finding a white powder substance to be
cocaine, the Colorado court held that it was non-testimonial and that Crawford did
not require its exclusion. Id. at *4.
263
Dedman, 102 P.3d at 635.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 636.
266
618 S.E.2d 347 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
267
Id. at 355.
268
Id.
269
Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). See also State v.
Carter, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (Mont. 2005) (Certifications, prepared by deputies, attesting to the proper inspection and maintenance of the Intoxilizer 5000 and which
were a necessary prerequisite for the introduction of its blood alcohol reading in a
DUI prosecution, were found to be non-testimonial. The court justified the conclusion that the certification did not fall within the “core group” of statements the
Confrontation Clause was meant to exclude, stating: “[S]uch certification reports are
not substantive evidence of a particular offense, but rather are foundational evidence
necessary for the admission of substantive evidence. In other words, the certification
reports are nontestimonial in nature in that they are foundational, rather than substantive or accusatory.”).
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tablish the necessary evidentiary predicate for admitting the result of
270
The defendant claimed that this certificate was an
the breath test.
affidavit, prepared for use in his criminal trial, and therefore was testimonial and controlled by Crawford. The court, though conceding
that the certificate may be said to be an affidavit, concluded, directly
271
contrary to the Florida Shiver decision, that it was not testimonial
within the meaning of Crawford. The court explained:
[W]e do not see how the admission of these certificates would
serve to preclude any meaningful cross-examination of the breath
test evidence presented against him. Even though the inspector
of the machine and the Director of Toxicology who executed the
certification of inspection did not testify at trial, the information
contained in the certificates does not pertain to the issue of guilt.
Rather, that information simply goes to inspection and certification matters. In our view, a defendant’s inability to cross-examine
that information which is contained in the certificates is not similar to the type of evidence that was of concern to the Crawford
court. Otherwise, the unreasonable alternative is to have a toxicologist in
every court on a daily basis offering testimony about his inspection of a
breathalyzer machine and the certification of the officer as a proper admin272
istrator of the breath test. Such a practice is obviously impractical.

It thus appears that, largely for pragmatic reasons, some courts
are willing to create “exceptions” as to when an affidavit or certification, prepared for use in a criminal prosecution, will be considered
testimonial for Crawford purposes. Such pragmatic concerns, however, may find compatibility with the dictates of Crawford without
273
ignoring the obvious, which is that these certificates are testimonial.
274
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in State v. Cunningham, found
such compatibility to exist where a statutory scheme authorized such
affidavits to be introduced in lieu of the affiant’s trial testimony only
where: (1) sufficient and proscribed pretrial notice of the intent to
do so is given by the state to the accused, (2) the accused had the
election to have the state compel the attendance and testimony of the
affiant at trial and (3) the accused fails to do so. Finding that these
statutory requirements were satisfied, the court in Cunningham concluded that a criminalist’s report identifying the contents of a baggie
as marijuana was properly admitted, since the accused failed to timely
270

Napier, 820 N.E.2d at 147.
Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
272
Napier, 820 N.E.2d at 149 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
273
For an analogous discussion regarding Federal Rule of Evidence 806, see supra
notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
274
903 So. 2d 1110, 1121 (La. 2005).
271
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object and require the attendance of the declarant, and therefore ef275
fectively waived his constitutional right to confront him.
7.

Statements Made by Victims, Informants or Witnesses
to Law Enforcement Personnel

a.

Statements Made in 911 Calls

Prior to Crawford, Professors Richard D. Friedman and Bridget
McCormick urged in regards to “dial-in testimony” reconsideration of
Roberts’s “reliability” or “trustworthy” approach in favor of the testi276
monial approach that was ultimately embraced by Crawford.
They
did so, in part, specifically to address the phenomenon of using domestic violence victims’ prior 911 statements as substantive evidence
277
against the accused where the victim does not testify at the trial.
These professors observed:
The phenomenon we have described represents a dramatic
change in the way criminal cases have traditionally been tried.
Trying a case without the live testimony of the victim or complainant is nothing new; as we have acknowledged, that is how
murder cases are necessarily tried. Instead, what is novel is that
prosecutors are trying cases by relying on the out-of-court accusations of the complainant, sometimes in contravention of her live
testimony and, most notably, often without presenting her live testimony, even though she may be perfectly available to testify.
What is more, prosecutors routinely do so, and the courts are let278
ting them do it.

Anyone familiar with domestic violence and subsequent prosecutions arising out of it is aware of this phenomenon. Frequently, a call
is made to 911 by someone asserting that she is the victim of abuse,
often at the hand of her spouse or boyfriend, seeking an immediate
law enforcement and emergency response. A tape recording of this
call is often made. This domestic violence victim, unlike other victims, usually has a significant relationship to her alleged attacker.
During the prosecutorial period and before the trial commences, circumstances often operate on such victims to render them reluctant to

275

Id. at 1122.
Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-in Testimony, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1171, 1172–74, 1224–28 (2002). These professors also participated in preparing
an amicus brief in Crawford advancing the “testimonial” approach. See supra note 156
(listing the other professors and referring to parts of their argument).
277
Id. at 1174–80.
278
Id. at 1180.
276
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279

testify on behalf of the prosecution at trial.
The victim may reconcile with her spouse or attacker and may even continue or resume
living with him. Because of this reconciliation, the victim may no
longer desire to cooperate with the government. In other cases, she
may refuse to cooperate due to fear of retaliation or loss of financial
support. Finally, in some cases, the victim may not cooperate simply
because she knows the 911 report was false and was made in anger.
In such cases, prosecutors attempt to salvage their cases by seeking
the introduction of the victim’s 911 statements as a substitution for
280
Could a victim’s statements
her unobtainable present testimony.
made during a 911 call or to the responding officers be used substantively at trial over the confrontation objection of the defendant?
Would the statements be deemed “testimonial” under Crawford such
that they could not be admitted unless the victim presently testified
or the accused had a prior meaningful opportunity to cross-examine
her?
Professors Friedman and McCormack opined that not all statements made during 911 calls would necessarily be classified as
testimonial and offered these considerations for classifying them:
Now consider statements made in 911 calls and to responding
police officers. A reasonable person knows she is speaking to officialdom—either police officers or agents whose regular
employment calls on them to pass information on to law enforcement, from whom it may go to the prosecutorial authorities.
The caller’s statements may therefore serve either or both of two
primary objectives—to gain immediate official assistance in ending or relieving an exigent, perhaps dangerous, situation, and to
279

See Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (identifying fear
of reprisal, hope of reconciliation, and financial and support concerns as reasons a
victim might decide not to cooperate with a prosecution, and citing one source as
estimating that between as many “as eighty and ninety percent of domestic violence
victims recant their accusations or refuse to cooperate with a prosecution.” (citing
Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36
IND. L. REV. 687, 709 n.76 (2003))); People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (Crim.
Ct. 2004) (“Prosecutors like to point out that some complainants in domestic assault
cases are unwilling to testify at trial because they fear the defendant, because they are
economically or emotionally dependent upon the defendant, or because they are reluctant to break up their own families. Defense lawyers, for their part, like to point
out that some complainants in domestic assault cases do not come forward to testify
at trial because they fear that cross-examination will expose their original complaints
as false or greatly exaggerated.”).
280
See, e.g., Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 878 (“In any event, because complainants in
domestic violence cases often do not appear for trial, prosecutors have in recent
years increasingly tried to fashion ‘victimless’ prosecutions. In such a case, the government tries to prove the defendant's guilt without testimony from the complainant
through other evidence.”).
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provide information to aid investigation and possible prosecution
related to that situation. In occasional cases, the first objective
may dominate—the statement is little more than a cry for help—
and such statements may be considered nontestimonial, at least to
the extent that they are not offered to prove the truth of what
they assert. But as our discussion in Part I has shown, these
statements are often more detailed, providing significant information that the police do not need for immediate intervention but
that may be useful to the criminal justice system. A reasonable
person in the position of the declarant would realize that such information would likely be used in a criminal investigation or
prosecution. Accordingly, such a statement should be considered
testimonial, and the confrontation right should apply to it.
. . . The more the statement narrates events, rather than merely
asking for help, the more likely it is to be considered testimonial.
Thus, if any significant time has passed since the events it describes, the statement is probably testimonial. When, as is often
the case, the 911 call consists largely of a series of questions by the
operator, and responses by the caller, concerning not only the
current incident but the history of the relationship, the caller’s
281
statements should be considered testimonial.

In spite of the fact that the United States Supreme Court
adopted the “testimonial” approach, advanced by these professors in
order to curb this practice, a survey of post-Crawford cases indicates a
strong desire of some lower courts to preserve this source of admissible evidence by classifying 911 calls as “non-testimonial.”
Less than three weeks after the Crawford decision, the beginning
282
of this trend was first, and perhaps prematurely, exhibited in the
opinion of a City of New York Criminal Court judge in People v. Mo283
scat.
In an opinion denying a motion in limine to exclude a 911
call purportedly made by the victim in a domestic violence case, this
judge described such evidence as follows:
Perhaps the most common form of such evidence is a call for
help made by a woman to 911. Typically, in such a call a woman
tells the 911 operator (in New York City, a civilian police employee) that her boyfriend has just shot, stabbed or beaten her
(and may be about to do so again); usually, the woman hurriedly
answers a few questions from the operator and then asks the op-

281

Friedman & McCormack, supra note 276, at 1242–43 (footnote omitted).
See supra note 168 (describing a New York Times article alleging the judge was so
eager to rule on a Crawford issue that he invented facts not presented in the trial).
283
777 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
282
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erator to send police officers and an ambulance to her aid. The
284
present case fits that description.

In concluding that the 911 call did not resemble police interrogations or circumstances wherein the declarant is “bearing witness” in
contemplation of future legal proceedings, under one of Crawford’s
suggested formulations of the term “testimonial,” the court explained:
A 911 call is typically initiated not by the police, but by the victim of a crime. It is generated not by the desire of the
prosecution or the police to seek evidence against a particular
suspect; rather, the 911 call has its genesis in the urgent desire of
a citizen to be rescued from immediate peril. Thus a pretrial examination is clearly “testimonial” in nature in part because it is
undertaken by the government in contemplation of pursuing
criminal charges against a particular person. But a 911 call is
fundamentally different; it is undertaken by a caller who wants
protection from immediate danger. A testimonial statement is
produced when the government summons a citizen to be a witness; in a 911 call, it is the citizen who summons the government
to her aid.
....
. . . Typically, a woman who calls 911 for help because she has
just been stabbed or shot is not contemplating being a “witness”
in future legal proceedings; she is usually trying simply to save her
285
own life.

The court also noted that the 911 call would likely be admitted as an
excited utterance; under this exception the declarant’s ability to engage in reflective thinking must necessarily be diminished due to the
stress produced by a startling event. In such a state, the court reasoned, the victim is not likely to fabricate her statement nor
286
contemplate its use in future proceedings.
Since the 911 call was
not “testimonial,” the judge ruled that it could be introduced into
evidence “without offending the Sixth Amendment” as long as it
287
meets the requirements for an exception to the hearsay rules.
A California Court of Appeal decision, citing Moscat and applying its rationale, approved of the admission of a spontaneous 911 call

284

Id. at 878 (emphasis added).
Id. at 879–80.
286
Id. at 880. See also Commonwealth v. Eichele, 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 460, 469 (Pa.
Ct. Com. Pl. 2004) (deciding that an excited utterance a witness made to his girlfriend was not testimonial, and commenting that “[c]onceptually, an excited
utterance is at the opposite end of the hearsay spectrum from testimonial hearsay”).
287
Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
285
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288

from the victim over confrontation objections.
This court emphasized that it would be “difficult to identify any circumstances under
which a . . . spontaneous statement would be ‘testimonial,’” since it
289
must be made without reflection.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found a twelve-year-old’s
911 call, made while witnessing an argument between his aunt and
her boyfriend that escalated into an assault by firearm, was “emotional and spontaneous” and not “deliberate and calculated” and
therefore “was an excited utterance, and under these circumstances,
290
nontestimonial.”
A Minnesota court of appeals likewise admitted a victim’s 911
291
excited utterance over a Crawford confrontation objection. Also citing Moscat, the court found that the victim’s statement describing the
292
attack and identifying the attacker was not testimonial.
It justified
this conclusion by noting that statements made in 911 calls are normally made during, or moments after, a criminal episode, under
stress, and the caller is usually seeking protection from an “immediate danger” and not because of a desire that the furnished
293
The court further explained
information be used at a later trial.
the following:
Even under the broadest definition of “testimonial” cited in Crawford, which focuses on whether an objective witness would
reasonably believe the statement would later be available for use
at trial, the 911 call does not qualify as “testimonial” evidence.
Statements in a 911 call by a victim struggling for self-control and
survival only moments after an assault simply do not qualify as
knowing responses to structured questioning in an investigative
environment in which the declarant reasonably expects that the
294
responses will be used in later judicial proceedings.

However, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, though affirming this
295
decision, rejected the categorical approach.
The court noted that,
288

People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 776.
290
United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 2005).
291
State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 701 N.W.2d
802 (Minn. 2005).
292
Id. at 302–03.
293
Id. at 302.
294
Id.
295
State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 811 (Minn. 2005). The court noted that the
911 call was placed shortly after the assailant had left and ended immediately after
being notified by the operator of the perpetrator’s apprehension. Id. During the
conversation, the caller was “trembling, stuttering, crying, [and] hyperventilating.”
Id. (alternation in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the court
289
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in reference to 911 calls whereby the caller is seeking protection from
imminent peril, some courts have categorically found statements
made by the caller to be non-testimonial and others have reached the
296
opposite conclusion. The court, noting that most courts take an ad
hoc approach, concluded:
[I]t is appropriate to evaluate whether statements made during
911 calls are testimonial in light of the circumstances under which
the calls are made. Accordingly, we decline to adopt a categorical
rule that all statements made during 911 calls are nontestimo297
nial.

Also adhering to the Moscat rationale, the Ohio Court of Appeals
held that an eyewitness’s 911 report of a victim being attacked by her
298
boyfriend, admitted as an excited utterance, was non-testimonial.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that a “severely
frightened” homicide victim’s frantic call to police reporting an intruder was not a “testimonial” statement, and therefore not the type
299
The
of statement with which the Crawford Court was concerned.
court explained that the victim was “in no way being interrogated by
[police] but instead sought their help in ending a frightening intru300
sion into her home.”
301
In People v. Caudillo, a California appeals court considered the
propriety of admitting, over a confrontation objection, a bystander’s
eyewitness account made during a 911 call, describing a shooting and
providing a description of the assailant and his car. The court noted
that the defendant contended
that the 911 call in this case is distinguishable from the call considered by the court in Moscat. He points out that the caller in
this case called for the specific reason of providing the police with
information identifying the shooter so as to help in his apprehension and potential prosecution. He further points out that the
caller was a third party witness, rather than the victim, arguing
302
that the call was not part of the criminal incident itself.
noted the operator was focused on “obtaining information for an immediate intervention rather than a future prosecution” and sought to calm her and assure her that
she was safe. Id. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the victim’s
911 statements were non-testimonial. Id.
296
Id. at 810.
297
Wright, 701 N.W.2d at 811.
298
State v. Byrd, 828 N.E.2d 133, 136–37 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
299
Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663, 683 & n.22 (9th Cir. 2004).
300
Id.
301
19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574 (Ct. App. 2004), review granted and opinion superseded by 23
Cal. Rptr. 3d 294 (Cal. 2005).
302
Id. at 588.
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Rejecting these contentions, the court found the call to be nontestimonial, and thus not barred under Crawford, because the declarant was speaking to the dispatcher who was merely attempting to
obtain information to permit an appropriate response in aiding the
victim and apprehending the perpetrator, and this was in “stark contrast” to the statement Sylvia made to the police in Crawford, which
was the product of formal interrogation and made after the arrest of
303
both Sylvia and the defendant. Purporting to apply the “reasonable
expectation” formulation described in Crawford, the court further justified its conclusion: “This was a classic 911 call, made immediately
after a crime was committed. The caller was simply requesting help
from the police by describing what she saw without thinking about
304
whether her statements would be used at a later trial.”
In stark contrast to Caudillo in California, consider the New York
305
case of People v. Dobbin.
An eyewitness to the robbery of a parking
lot attendant made a 911 call reporting the crime and describing the
306
This court found the call to be testimonial and inadmissirobber.
ble under Crawford, explaining:
The 911 call, in this case, contains a solemn declaration for the
purpose of establishing the fact that the defendant is committing
a robbery. The caller is making a formal out of court statement to
a government officer for the purpose of establishing this fact.
The caller’s statement is not a “casual remark to an acquaintance.” The caller was officially reporting a crime to the
government agency entrusted with this very serious and important
function. As such, the 911 call falls within the category of out of
court statements which reflect the focus of the Confrontation
Clause; the out of court statements of “‘witnesses’ against the ac307
cused in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’”

The respondent’s prediction during the Crawford oral argument,
that two different judges looking at exactly the same facts might come
to opposite conclusions no matter what definition was adopted by the
308
Court, seems to have been borne out in these cases.

303

Id. at 590.
Id.
305
People v. Dobbin, 791 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
306
Id. at 898.
307
Id. at 900 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)). The
court also noted 911 callers would reasonably expect that evidentiary use would likely
be made of the information conveyed. Id. at 901.
308
See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing this reality of human nature).
304
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Contrary to the rationale and conclusion reached in Moscat, another New York trial judge found to be testimonial, and thus
inadmissible under Crawford, a 911 call from an eyewitness reporting
a robbery and shooting who, in response to the operator’s questions,
309
described the crime, its location, and the perpetrator. That the 911
statements would qualify as spontaneous declarations did not preclude this judge from finding it to be testimonial under Crawford.
The judge observed:
Crawford requires a reexamination of the basis for treating spontaneous declarations as admissible hearsay, including statements
in a 911 call reporting a crime. Calls to 911 to report a crime are
testimonial under the test set out. When a 911 call is made to report a crime and supply information about the circumstances and
the people involved, the purpose of the information is for investigation, prosecution, and potential use at a judicial proceeding; it
310
makes no difference what the caller believes.

Some courts observing the contradictory rationales and conclusions regarding Crawford’s application to 911 calls have opted for an
ad hoc approach to determining whether a particular 911 call should
311
be classified as testimonial under Crawford. In People v. West, for example, a female cab driver who had been raped by several men and
whose cab had been stolen, approached the door of a house and
312
The homeowner immediately called 911 and
cried out for help.
reported the crime, relaying to the victim the operator’s questions as
to her condition and the description of her cab, and then providing
313
the victim’s answers to the operator. Citing Crawford, the defendant
contended that the homeowner’s statements during the 911 call were
testimonial and therefore its admission, given the fact that the homeowner was unavailable at trial, violated his Sixth Amendment
314
confrontation rights.
Noting the conflicting views of other courts, the West court declined to adopt a “bright line” rule for classifying all 911 calls as
either testimonial or non-testimonial, but rather took a case-by-case
315
The court explained that considapproach to deciding the issue.
eration should be given to two questions in this inquiry. First, was the
statement volunteered in order to “initiate police action or criminal
309
310
311
312
313
314
315

People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
Id. at 415.
823 N.E.2d 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 91.
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316

prosecution”?
If so, it would qualify as testimonial because “an objective individual would reasonably believe that when he or she
reports a crime they are ‘bearing witness’ and that their statement
317
Second,
will be available for use at future criminal proceedings.”
was the statement procured by interrogation, the purpose of which
318
If so, it would be testimonial because, as a
was to obtain evidence?
“product of evidence producing questions,” its use would “implicate
319
the central concerns underlying the confrontation clause.”
As to
the 911 call by the homeowner, the court concluded that the portion
of the call concerning the nature of the attack, the victim’s needs,
and her age and location were not testimonial because the dispatcher
was motivated by a desire to secure medical attention and not to gar320
ner evidence.
However, that portion of the call wherein the
homeowner described the cab, articles that were taken, and the perpetrators’ direction of flight was garnered by the operator’s desire to
321
involve the police and for evidentiary use.
A Washington court of appeals, quoting at length the considerations Professors Friedman and McCormack, thought pertinent to the
322
classification of a 911 call as testimonial, also rejected a “bright
323
The case involved a
line” rule in favor of a case-by-case approach.
911 call, in which the caller reported that the defendant had been in
her home in violation of a no-contact order. The court concluded
that the call was testimonial because, “[d]espite the seriousness of
Powers’ alleged conduct, [the declarant’s] call was not ‘part of the
criminal incident itself’ or a request for help entitling the State to
prove their case without affording Powers the opportunity to cross
324
examine the [declarant], the right Crawford protects.” Additionally,
the court characterized her call as a report of a violation of a court
order by Powers, which she made for the purpose of his apprehen325
sion and prosecution.

316

Id.
West, 823 N.E.2d at 91.
318
Id.
319
Id.
320
Id.
321
Id. at 91–92.
322
State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). See Friedman &
McCormack, supra note 276 and accompanying text.
323
Powers, 99 P.3d at 1266.
324
Id. at 1264, 1266.
325
Id. at 1266.
317
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Statements to First Responders

Another problematic area in the immediate post-Crawford period
has been how to classify statements by victims and witnesses made directly to law enforcement personnel who immediately respond to a
location upon being alerted to a possible criminal event.
After Crawford, the Indiana Court of Appeals consistently and
categorically concluded that statements elicited as a result of initial
questioning by responding officers arriving immediately or shortly after the occurrence were not testimonial, reasoning that the lack of
structure, adversarial quality, and formality in such an interchange do
not bear any resemblance to the term “interrogation” as described in
Crawford, and because excited utterances, by their nature, preclude
reflection and the ability to anticipate that evidentiary use would be
326
made of such statements. In Hammon v. State, the Indiana Court of
Appeals concluded that, had Crawford intended that all statements in
response to any police questioning would qualify as “testimonial,” the
327
Instead, the Indiana court
Supreme Court would have so stated.
noted that Crawford’s holding was limited to police “interrogation,” a
narrower term, explaining as follows:
We conclude this choice of words clearly indicates that police “interrogation” is not the same as, and is much narrower than, police
“questioning.” To the extent the Supreme Court said that it used
the term “interrogation” “in its colloquial . . . sense,” we believe
that reference to a lay dictionary for a definition of “interrogation” is appropriate. “Interrogation” is defined in one common
English dictionary as “To examine by questioning formally or officially.” This is consistent with our prior observation that the
common characteristic of all “testimonial” statements is the formality by which they are produced. We also believe that
“interrogation” carries with it a connotation of an at least slightly
adversarial setting.

326

See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 814 N.E.2d 695, 701–02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
the excited utterance of a criminal negligence victim regarding a barroom altercation with a named individual, made to the first responding officers shortly after the
occurrence, was non-testimonial); Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004) (finding excited utterances of a “crying” and “bleeding” domestic violence victim made to a responding officer within fifteen minutes of placing a 911 call was
non-testimonial, noting the officer’s questioning did not “qualify as classic, ‘police
interrogation’ as referred to in Crawford”); Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 947–48
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling non-testimonial the excited utterances made by a
“frightened” and “timid” domestic abuse victim in response to “preliminary investigatory” questions of the first officer at the scene, and which described the incident and
named the assailant), vacated, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
327
Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 952.
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. . . Whatever else police “interrogation” might be, we do not believe that word applies to preliminary investigatory questions
328
asked at the scene of a crime shortly after it has occurred.

The court added this additional reasoning regarding excited utterances made to first responders being non-testimonial: “An
unrehearsed statement made without time for reflection or deliberation, as required to be an ‘excited utterance,’ is not ‘testimonial’ in
that such a statement, by definition, has not been made in contem329
plation of its use in a future trial.”
The Supreme Court of Indiana, approximately one year later,
330
though affirming the case, vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision.
In doing so, it appeared to have rejected the Court of Appeals’ first

328

Id. (citations omitted). For another court using similar reasoning, see People v.
Bradley, 799 N.Y.S.2d 472 (App. Div. 2005). That court found non-testimonial under
Crawford a bloodied victim’s excited utterance, describing being thrown through a
glass door by her boyfriend, which was given in answer to the initial question, “What
happened?” by a police officer responding to a 911 call. Id. at 478–79. In doing so,
the court rejected the formulation, suggested but not adopted in Crawford and advanced by the defendant, that the testimonial character of the victim’s utterance
should depend on whether she had the expectation that her statement may be utilized in a subsequent trial. Id. at 479. Rather, the court considered controlling the
determination of “the objective of the person posing the question.” Id. at 480. It
stated:
Where the purpose of the inquiry is to gain general familiarity with the
situation confronting a police officer to determine what happened, the
officer is making only a preliminary investigatory inquiry. Thus, the response is not the product of a structured police interrogation and
should not be regarded as testimonial. However, where the purpose of
the inquiry is to gather incriminating evidence against a particular individual, the officer is advancing a potential prosecution, and the
response takes on a testimonial character.
Id.
329
Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 953. Applying similar reasoning, see also State v. Anderson, No. E2004-00694-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 171441 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27,
2005), where the court, holding juveniles’ excited utterances to responding officers,
implicating the defendant in a burglary that was still in progress, were testimonial
under Crawford, stated:
[T]he essential characteristics that cause the juveniles’ statements to
fall within the ambit of the excited utterance exception conflict with
the characteristics that would make them testimonial. The underlying
rationale for the excited utterance exception is that the perceived
event produces nervous excitement, making fabrication of statements
about that event unlikely. Because an excited utterance is a reactionary
event of the senses made without reflection or deliberation, it cannot
be testimonial in that such a statement has not been made in contemplation of its use in a future trial.
Id. at *4.
330
Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
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categorical conclusion, but seemed to have ratified the second, stating:
[W]e agree with the Court of Appeals in its view that responses to
initial inquiries at a crime scene are typically not “testimonial.”
We do not agree, however, that a statement that qualifies as an
“excited utterance” is necessarily nontestimonial. The Court of
Appeals is likely correct that the declarant of an excited utterance
will ordinarily lack the requisite motive because the heat of the
moment makes it unlikely that the declarant is focusing on preservation rather than communication of information. But an
interrogating officer may be so motivated. Thus, the “structured
questioning” identified by some courts as an indicium of a testimonial statement may be best understood as evidence of a
331
purpose to elicit testimonial statements.

Consistent with the approach taken by the earlier Indiana Court
of Appeals decisions regarding statements made to first responders,
courts in other jurisdictions have likewise determined such state332
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in
ments to be non-testimonial.
doing so, commented, “[c]ourts have almost uniformly held that
statements made to police officers responding to an emergency call
for help were, at the initial stage of the encounter, not testimonial,
because they were intended to help officers assess the situation and
331

Id. at 453.
People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding domestic
violence victim’s responses to first responder’s “unstructured” and “preliminary”
questions were not testimonial); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 856–57 (Ct.
App. 2004) (concluding that assault victim’s description of the assault and the identity of his mother as the assailant, made in the emergency room of a hospital to an
officer responding to an “injured persons” call, and which consisted of what the defense described as “detailed answers given in direct response to questions” was not
testimonial); People v. King, No. 02CA0201, 2005 WL 170727, at *2–3 (Colo. Ct.
App. Jan. 27, 2005) (finding excited utterances made by a stabbed and bleeding sexual assault victim over a two-hour period to a responding officer both at the scene
and during an ambulance ride were not testimonial under Crawford); United States v.
Webb, No. DV-339-04, 2004 WL 2726100, at *2–4 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2004) (declaring statements of an injured, bleeding and crying assault victim, responding to an
officer’s repeated question as to what happened were non-testimonial because the
questions that elicited them lacked formality and “premeditation” and were not primarily motivated by the desire to collect evidence but rather prompted by a concern
for the victim’s safety); State v. Maclin, No. W2003-03123-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL
313977, at *17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 2005) (holding aggravated assault victim’s
excited utterances to responding police officers, whom she had summoned, were not
testimonial because she was not involved in “a formal statement or a police interrogation” when she made the statements). See also Spencer v. State, 162 S.W.3d 877,
881 (Tex. App. 2005) (holding that a domestic violence victim’s excited utterance to
responding officers, during the “initial assessment and securing of a crime scene” was
not testimonial, but stating, “we decline to join those courts that have established a
bright-line rule that excited utterances can never be testimonial”).
332
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333

secure the scene.”
Others, however, have applied an ad hoc approach to determining whether statements made to first responders
qualify as testimonial under Crawford. One court said such an approach required an inquiry centered around whether the responding
officer was acting at the time in an investigative capacity seeking to
produce evidence for prosecutorial purposes or was involved in the
334
Another court taking a
preliminary task of securing the scene.
case-by-case approach identified factors it deemed appropriate to
consider when determining whether statements made to responding
335
These facofficers at the scene should be considered testimonial.
tors included (1) the formality of the setting generating the
statements, (2) whether they were recorded, (3) the declarant’s
“primary purpose in making the statements,” and (4) whether an “objective declarant” in her position would realize the evidentiary use
336
If the statement had been made to
that would be made of them.
law enforcement, further consideration should include a determination as to who initiated the contact and the existence of “structured
337
questioning.”
333

State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Neb. 2005). Finding that a “crying,
hysterical, trembling” victim’s statements to responding officers who arrived within
five minutes of receiving the call were non-testimonial under Crawford, the court
concluded that these statements “were not made in anticipation of eventual prosecution, but were made to assist in securing the scene and apprehending the suspect.”
Id. It would seem that since an arrest is usually the initial, indispensable step towards
a successful prosecution, a statement made for the purpose of “apprehending” the
perpetrator would be made anticipating eventual prosecution.
334
People v. Kilday, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 161, 172–73 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a
“frightened and upset” domestic violence victim’s statements regarding an assault
earlier that day, made initially to an officer responding to a domestic violence call
placed by a concerned third party, where the officers were then unaware of the nature of the crime or identity of the perpetrator, were not-testimonial, but several later
statements made after the scene was secured were considered testimonial), review
granted and opinion superseded by 105 P.3d 114 (Cal. 2005).
335
People v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870, 873–74 (Crim. Ct. 2004) (listing and applying these factors, the court found statements made by an assault victim to a police
officer she flagged down, describing an assault by her boyfriend, were nontestimonial). See also State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211 (Me. 2004) (applying similar
factors to determine that statements by a woman, under stress, who went to the police station and made statements to the police, at a time when they were unaware of
any criminal activity, were not testimonial as they were not the product of “tactically
structured police questioning”).
336
Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 873–74.
337
Id. at 874. A New York court applied an ad hoc analysis utilizing similar factors
and found two of three successive statements to be non-testimonial. People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *13–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004). The
court found a spontaneous and unsolicited statement of a robbery victim to the immediately responding police officer about who robbed him, and another to the same
officer prompted only by a question about whether anyone else was involved to be

LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

2006]

1/9/2006 12:11:42 PM

CONFRONTATION AFTER CRAWFORD

397
338

The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Wright
likewise
joined those jurisdictions applying an ad hoc approach in classifying
statements made to first responders. This court, reviewing decisions
from other courts, identified eight useful considerations for determining whether such statements are testimonial:
1. Was the declarant a victim or observer?
2. What was the declarant’s motive for speaking to the
officer?
3. Who initiated the conversation?
4. Where did the conversation take place?
5. What was the declarant’s emotional condition?
6. What was the level of structure and formality present in
the conversation?
7. What was the officer’s motivation in talking to the
declarant?
8. Was the conversation recorded, and if so by what
339
method?
While noting that this list was long, the court emphasized that “other
340
considerations also may prove useful.”
Utilizing these factors, the
court found that a statement made to a responding police officer a
half hour after the incident by an “emotionally distraught” assault victim, who was not just an observer, who initiated the contact, and who
341
The court found the
was seeking protection, was non-testimonial.
statements to be non-testimonial in spite of the fact that the conversation was recorded by the officer taking notes and that these notes and
the conversation were utilized to support a lawful arrest and aided
342
the officer in giving subsequent testimony.
Other courts applying similar factors concluded that statements
given at the scene and shortly after the occurrence of a crime, if elicited by preliminary questions of responding and “investigating”
343
officers, are non-testimonial.
non-testimonial. Id. However, a third statement to the same officer, which
amounted to a solicited narrative of crime, was testimonial. Id.
338
701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005).
339
Id. at 812–13.
340
Id. at 813.
341
Id. at 813–14.
342
Id.
343
People v. Victors, 819 N.E.2d 311, 324 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (pointing out that the victim’s statement was given “mere minutes” after the
incident, in response to a simple police question about what was happening and in
an informal and unstructured setting). See also State v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750 (Conn.
2005). The Connecticut Supreme Court found non-testimonial a gunshot-victim’s
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The current Indiana approach for classifying such statements as
testimonial, as revealed by its Supreme Court in Hammon, requires a
determination as to whether, in the context of answering preliminary
questions of the initially responding officer, the answers were either
given or obtained “in significant part for purposes of preserving it for
344
potential future use in legal proceedings.”
The court suggested
that even where the victim or others may not have a prosecutorial
motivation (because of the victim’s excitement and the resulting impairment of the ability to reflect), if the officer was attempting to “pin
down and preserve statements” as opposed to simply attempting to
determine whether an offense has occurred, to provide protection
and to apprehend the suspect, the statements obtained would be tes345
timonial.
346
In United States v. Arnold, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
347
applied its previous broad Cromer criteria for determining the testimonial nature of hearsay statements to the issue of whether a 911
call and subsequent statements by a distraught victim to first re348
As applied in Arnold, that criterion is
sponders were testimonial.
whether the statements made “knowingly to the authorities . . . de349
If so, then the statement is “almost
scribe[ ] criminal activity.”
350
always testimonial.”
The court found that an assault victim’s 911
call and subsequent statements to responding police approximately
fifteen minutes later describing the assault, the weapon used, and
351
Though the court noted
naming her attacker, to be testimonial.
that during the conversation with the officer she was “upset to the
352
point that she had difficulty speaking,” it concluded the statements

statement given immediately after the incident to an officer he approached on the
street. Id. at 776. The statement, to some extent possibly elicited by the officer, described the location of the offense and informed the officer that he thought he had
been shot. Id. at 775. He also informed the officer that he did not see his assailant.
Id. at 712. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the statement “can
be ‘seen as part of the criminal incident itself, rather than as part of the prosecution
that follow[ed].’” Id. (quoting People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (Crim. Ct.
2004)).
344
Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 456 (Ind. 2005).
345
Id.
346
410 F.3d 895 (6th Cir. 2005).
347
United States v. Cromer, 398 F.3d 662, 665 (6th Cir. 2004).
348
Arnold, 410 F.3d at 903.
349
Id. at 904.
350
Id.
351
Id.
352
Id. at 897.
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of the victim “were knowingly made to authorities” and “describe[d]
353
criminal activity.”
The foregoing description of varying attempts by courts to apply
the Crawford testimonial approach to domestic violence and assault
victims’ statements during 911 calls or to first responders gives rise to
certain concerns. The phenomenon that domestic violence victims
often refuse or are reluctant to participate in the prosecution of their
previously identified tormentor should neither prompt nor justify
courts applying Crawford’s testimonial approach to suspend logic, to
selectively emphasize Crawford criteria that support admission and ignore others, or to undermine the underlying need and importance of
confrontation in these situations. Professors Friedman and McCormack, by conceding that some 911 calls made by domestic violence
victims may be non-testimonial “cries for help,” have unintentional354
ly opened the door through which some post-Crawford courts have
leapt, allowing into evidence domestic violence statements that are at
the core of what the Confrontation Clause was meant to exclude: accusatorial statements knowingly made to law enforcement officers.
They have done so by selectively emphasizing those criteria described
in Crawford that would justify admission of these statements and ignoring those criteria that did not. Justifying the classification of
statements made to first responders and 911 operators as nontestimonial simply because the questioning was not highly structured
or formal is but one example.
Though Crawford clearly included structured and formal police
355
interrogation in its concept of “testimonial,” it did not limit the
356
357
classification to such. Many courts, but not all, seem to ignore or
353

Id. at 904.
The professors simply observed that in some cases the victim’s frantic 911 call
could be admitted as a “cry for help” though they added, “at least to the extent they are
not offered to prove the truth of what they assert.” Friedman & McCormack, supra note
276, at 1242 (emphasis added).
355
The Crawford opinion offers little evidence that structure and formality are
necessary prerequisites for classifying police questioning as interrogation. It simply
concluded that, within any “conceivable” definition of “interrogation,” Sylvia’s “recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police questioning”
would qualify. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004). But see State v.
Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 324 (Md. 2005) (“The [Crawford] Court, however, did emphasize the formal nature of police questioning in its articulation of when an
‘interrogation’ occurs. This characterization is buttressed by the most commonly
understood sense of the verb ‘interrogate’: ‘to question formally and systemically.’”
(citing MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 612 (10th ed. 1993))).
356
See Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 811–12 (D.C. 2005) (“[T]he term
‘police interrogation’ is used frequently in the Crawford opinion, without any suggestion that it means something more technical than questioning in a structured
354
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minimize the fact that the Crawford majority clearly meant the term
“interrogation” to go beyond that which was evidence by Sylvia’s interrogation in Crawford, by specifically stating that they were using the
358
The Supreme Judicial Court of Masterm in its “colloquial” sense.
359
sachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, is one of the few courts
that has not ignored the admonition of Crawford to construe the term
“interrogation” in its colloquial sense. As part of its formulation of an
360
impressive and comprehensive analytical approach for determining
whether hearsay is “testimonial” under Crawford, the court addressed
361
the meaning of “interrogation.”
Recognizing that Crawford utilized
the term interrogation in the “colloquial” sense, the court attempted
to determine its everyday common meaning within the general public
362
To do so, the court consulted Black’s Law
and legal community.
363
In Black’s
Dictionary and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.
Law Dictionary, the court noted one definition of the term “investigatory interrogation” as “routine, nonaccusatory questioning by the
364
police of a person who is not in custody.” It held that the term “interrogation” “must be understood expansively to mean all law
enforcement questioning related to the investigation or prosecution
365
of a crime.” It further concluded:
[Q]uestioning by law enforcement agents, whether police, prosecutors, or others acting directly on their behalf, other than to
secure a volatile scene or to establish the need for or provide
medical care, is interrogation in the colloquial sense. This inenvironment. Neither additional ‘formality’ nor an ‘adversarial setting,’ however
slight, is required.”).
357
See, e.g., Mason v. State, 173 S.W.3d 105, 111 (Tex. App. 2005). Rejecting the
view that “interrogation” for Sixth Amendment purposes should be given similar construction as that term is construed under the Fifth Amendment since the policies
underlying these separate provisions are distinct, the Texas court concluded the interrogation, as it relates to the Confrontation Clause, should not be limited to “words
or actions on the part of the police that were normally attendant to arrest and custody.” Id. The court went on to find that a victim’s excited utterance to a
responding officer, describing an assault by her boyfriend, prompted simply by the
question as to why she had called the police, was the product of “interrogation” as
that term is construed, under Crawford and in the context of the Confrontation
Clause. Id. See also infra notes 359–66 (discussing the approach followed in Massachusetts).
358
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.
359
833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005).
360
For a full discussion of this analytical approach, see infra notes 388–90.
361
Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 554–55.
362
Id. at 555.
363
Id.
364
Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 838 (8th ed. 2004)).
365
Id.
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cludes “investigatory interrogation,” such as preliminary fact
gathering and assessment whether a crime has taken place. Under our reading of Crawford, statements elicited by such
interrogation are per se testimonial and therefore implicate the
366
confrontation clause.
367

Similarly, an Arizona court of appeals decision classified as testimonial an eyewitness’s statements describing a homicide, given at
the scene of the crime to an officer (who already was aware that the
368
defendant had shot the victim).
The eyewitness who gave this
statement, Cory, had been previously separated from another witness,
Harold, before providing his version of the incident, and Cory’s questioning occurred only after the defendant had been arrested,
handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car and after Harold had been in369
terviewed for fifteen or twenty minutes. The court, in arriving at its
conclusion that Cory’s statement was testimonial, made the following
observation:
The historic underpinnings of the Confrontation Clause
as analyzed in Crawford lead us to the following conclusions.
First, not every police-citizen encounter will generate a testimonial statement because not every police-citizen
encounter will be an interrogation. Statements made by
witnesses to police so the police may secure their own or the
witnesses’ safety, render emergency aid, or protect the security of a crime scene may not be testimonial. Questioning
incidental to other law enforcement objectives, for example, “exigent safety, security, and medical concerns”
implicates core confrontation clause concerns less than
does police questioning directed toward the production of
370
evidence for use in a potential prosecution.

366
367
368
369
370

Id. 555–56 (footnote omitted).
State v. Parks, 116 P.3d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 642.
Id. at 633–35.
Id. at 641.
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371

Some courts, but not all, that appropriately consider all or
most of the Crawford criteria and formulations for determining the
testimonial classification suspend logic in order to satisfy them. As
shown above, some courts, following the lead of the early Moscat
opinion, have divined that domestic violence victims making a 911
call or excitedly reacting to the first responder do so solely as a cry for
help and without any motivation that their statements may be used as
372
evidence to prosecute the abuser.
It is inconceivable that a victim,
aware of the perpetration of a crime against her and purposely providing historical information about that crime to those she is aware
are law enforcement personnel, would not be at least partially motivated by the desire to assist in the eventual prosecution of the
perpetrator. To categorically speculate that in such situations she has
no motivation to assist law enforcement in making the assailant atone
for his criminal act is simply untenable.
Likewise, some courts’ analytical leapfrog in using the theoretical underpinnings of the excited utterance exception—that it
371

The following cases are illustrative of courts applying the Crawford formulations
with sound logic and common sense. Mason v. State considers statements made to an
officer responding to a 911 disturbance call. 173 S.W.3d 105, 106 (Tex. App. 2005).
Upon arrival and in response to the officer’s query about why she called the police,
an upset, crying and angry domestic violence victim described an attack by her boyfriend. Id. The court held that such qualified as interrogation in the colloquial
sense, and even if it did not, the victim’s description of the crime and identity of the
perpetrator to a policeman at the scene would lead an objective person to believe his
or her statement would be available for use in a future prosecution. Id. at 111.
A Florida court considered similar statements in Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). In response to a report of a kidnapping and assault, a police officer was dispatched to an apartment complex, where the officer encountered
the victim, who was nervous and upset. Id. at 695. Upon the officer’s query, the victim described being kidnapped and assaulted at gunpoint, pointed to the
perpetrator, and said the gun was in his car. Id. The court held that though these
statements qualified as excited utterances under Florida evidence law, they were testimonial and inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause in light of the Crawford
decision. Id. at 702. The court concluded that the utterances of the victim, even
though made in response to a question by police, were not likely the result of “interrogation” because it lacked sufficient structure, and the court determined that the
statements clearly did not fall within the classification of “formalized testimonial materials.” Id. at 698. However, it found that the statements were testimonial in light of
the fact that, under the circumstances, “he surely must have expected that the statement he made to Officer Gaston might be used in court against the defendant.” Id.
at 700. But see Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 354, 356 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005)
(claiming the Lopez court, in its holding, “apparently stands alone,” and finding an
assault victim’s excited utterance in answer to a responding officer inquiry as to what
happened (assailant hit victim with a pipe) was non-testimonial in spite of its accusatorial nature).
372
See supra notes 167, 280–85 and accompanying text (discussing Moscat); supra
notes 286–92, 296, 299 and accompanying text (discussing cases following Moscat).
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necessarily be made while the declarant’s ability to engage in reflective thought had been suspended by the stress of a startling event—to
jump to the conclusion that one making a qualifying excited utterance could not be aware of the evidentiary use that might be made of
373
them seems equally untenable. Even in the excitement and stress
of the moment, a domestic violence victim’s ability to provide useful
and apparently accurate historical information—at least from a
prosecutor’s standpoint—about the abuse and abuser and purposely
communicate it to inquiring officers, or persons acting on behalf of
law enforcement officers, seems to belie the reality of such a conclu374
sion.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a well reasoned opinion, emphasized this by observing that courts over the
years have broadened the excited utterance exception to include
“non-spontaneous statement[s] made ‘within a reasonably short period’ after a startling event, even if it was made in response to police
375
questioning.”
Rejecting the categorical notion that all excited ut373

See supra notes 284–95, 298–304 and accompanying text (describing reasoning
in Moscat and other cases).
374
Strictly construing the requirement that to qualify as an excited utterance the
statement must be made “without opportunity to deliberate or fabricate,” one court
found a seven-year-old burglary victim’s statement to a responding police officer did
not qualify. State v. Branch, 865 A.2d 673, 689–90 (N.J. 2005). In doing so the court
observed the following:
There is no question that Juliana’s statement related “to a startling
event,” i.e., the burglary. There is little question that Juliana was still
“under stress of excitement caused by the event” fifteen to twenty minutes after the burglary when the detective questioned her while she sat
on her mother’s lap. But it is somewhat doubtful that the statement
was made “without opportunity to deliberate,” at least in the way those
words are commonly understood.
Id. at 689. This court avoided a Crawford concern by deciding the issue on a state
evidentiary ground. Id. at 691. However, many of the cases described above, which
have found statements made to first responders or during 911 calls to be excited utterances, have not applied such a rigid interpretation to the exception’s “lack of
opportunity to deliberate” requirement. In spite of this fact, however, they still use
this requirement to justify the conclusion that the statement is not testimonial under
Crawford.
375
Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 808, 815 (D.C. 2005) (determining
nonetheless that sufficient uncertainty existed regarding the separation of various
portions of the witness’ utterances to the responding officers into testimonial and
non-testimonial statements such that the case had to be remanded to determine
“which, if any, statements by [the witness] were volunteered during Stage I, before
interrogation began, rather than having been made in response to [an officer’s]
questions in Stage II; and what, if anything, [the witness] said before the officers had
completed their initial task of securing the scene, separating the principals, and restoring a reasonable measure of calm”). See also Pitts v. State, 612 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2005) (finding, without classifying the statements as excited utterances, that a
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terances, because of their nature, are non-testimonial, this court concluded: “Some excited utterances are testimonial, and others are not,
depending upon the circumstances in which the particular statement
376
Other courts have also rejected the categorical classifiwas made.”
377
One Texas
cation of all excited utterances as non-testimonial.
appellate court said to do so would leave “the regulation of the Confrontation Clause to the Rules of Evidence, which is specifically
378
prohibited by Crawford. A Florida court observed:
In our view, the findings necessary to support a conclusion that
a statement was an excited utterance do not conflict with those

domestic violence victim’s 911 call informing the operator that her husband, in violation of a court order, had broken into her house and was preventing her from
leaving, made while the offense was still in progress and without “premeditation or
afterthought” was non-testimonial, but that her later statements describing the incident to the first responders, shortly after their arrival, but after the husband had
been arrested and taken away, were testimonial), cert. granted, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 534
(Ga. Sept. 19, 2005).
376
Stancil, 866 A.2d at 809 (suggesting that excited utterances, made in response
to an officer’s preliminary inquiry while attempting to secure the scene and to ensure the safety of those involved, including themselves, would not be classified as
testimonial, while those excited utterances rendered to police engaging in structured
questioning after the immediate emergency has passed would be deemed testimonial). One could imagine that, applying the Stancil rationale, an excited utterance
would be classified as non-testimonial in this hypothetical scenario: An officer spots a
crying and obviously distraught woman flagging him down, approaches her to ask
about what is wrong, and receives the reply, “I’ve just been raped by that man driving
off in the red car!” However, if the scenario is broadened to include the following,
the subsequent excited utterances would qualify as testimonial: After radioing for
others to intercept the fleeing assailant, the officer places the woman in his patrol
car, encourages her to calm down, and then asks her to tell him exactly what happened, whereupon the victim, still sobbing, responds by giving him a narrative
description of the attack and her attacker. See also Drayton v. United States, 877 A.2d
145, 151 (D.C. 2005). Following Stancil, the Drayton court found to be testimonial a
child victim’s excited utterances made to responding officers. Id. These officers
sought his “account” of an incident during which his mother, in an argument over
money, displayed a knife and threatened him. Id. The court concluded that since
the scene had been secured, the officers at that point “were investigating a crime and
fact-gathering in anticipation of potential future prosecution.” Id. This conclusion
was justified by the fact that the boy made the statement to the officers approximately fifteen minutes after the incident, after his mother had been disarmed,
arrested and placed in a patrol car, and after police had received a description of the
incident from a bystander. Id.
377
See Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 702 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (discussed supra note 371); Mason v. State, 173 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Tex. App. 2005) (“We
understand the State’s position to be that, by definition, an excited utterance is not
made under circumstances conducive to subjective contemplation of future legal
proceedings. We cannot agree.”); Moore v. State, 169 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Tex. App.
2005) (“Each statement must be analyzed individually independent of whether it is
an excited utterance under the Texas Rules of Evidence.”).
378
Moore, 169 S.W.3d at 474.
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that are necessary to support a conclusion that it was testimonial.
A statement made in the excitement of a startling event is likely to
be more reliable given the fact that the declarant had little time
to make up a story. But, under Crawford, reliability has no bearing
on the question of whether a statement was testimonial. Some
379
testimonial statements are reliable and others are not.

It is clear that to avoid the same dilemma as was created by the
Roberts “reliability” approach, where “indicia of reliability” were sub380
jectively determined by judges, the Supreme Court will need to
categorically identify specific factual applications of its classifications
of “interrogation” and “testimonial” in the context of 911 calls and
statements to first responders, otherwise result-oriented and contra381
dictory applications will continue.
c.

Statements Made During Law Enforcement’s “Field
Investigation”

Where formality and structure exist in field investigation questioning sessions, courts have been quite uniform in classifying
statements generated thereby as testimonial. For example, where an
assigned officer spoke first to the mother of a three-year-old sexual
abuse victim at the hospital, then interviewed the child the next day,
the child’s statements elicited by the officer’s query that she repeat
what she had told her mother were determined to be the product of
382
police interrogation and thus testimonial.
Another court found
that the existence of audio and video recordings of a patrol officer’s
vehicle stop was sufficient to render the subsequent roadside questioning of a passenger, after the arrest of the driver, sufficiently
structured and formal so that the resulting statements were “testimo383
nial.” Other courts have considered it significant that officers tape384
385
recorded the session or otherwise recorded it verbatim in their
379

Lopez, 888 So. 2d at 699.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62–68 (2004) (surveying and criticizing
courts’ application of the Roberts reliability approach).
381
See In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 802 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“Moreover, a court’s
attempt to fashion such factors into some type of litmus test for testimonial evidence
would undermine the confrontation clause’s protections. Vague standards are manipulable, and the neutral motives of the government official toward the declarant
are irrelevant.”).
382
People v. R.F., 825 N.E.2d 287, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
383
Lee v. State, 143 S.W.3d 565, 570–71 (Tex. App. 2004).
384
See, e.g., People v. Lee, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 309, 314 (Ct. App. 2004) (referring to
tape recorded statement of two witnesses, which filled seventeen pages of transcripts); People v. Pirwani, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 688–89 (Ct. App. 2004) (considering
theft victim’s videotaped statement to police concerning the loss as testimonial);
380
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conclusions that the statements were the result of “interrogation” and
were testimonial. Special circumstances, such as the fact that the po386
lice questioning occurred during the execution of a search warrant,
or that the declarant being interviewed was a confidential infor387
mant,
have also contributed to the classification of witnesses’
statements to officers during field investigations as testimonial.
8.

The Massachusetts Analytical Approach

Approximately a year and a half after Crawford’s reinterpretation
of how hearsay should be analyzed under the Confrontation Clause,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Gon388
salves, confronted for the first time the thorny issues left in that
decision’s wake. The court formulated an impressive analytical approach for analyzing the admissibility of hearsay under the Clause in
light of Crawford. This approach appears to remain faithful to the
core values of the Clause as articulated in Crawford. In its formulation, the Massachusetts court recognized that prosecutors must adjust
the manner in which they prosecute domestic violence and gangrelated cases heretofore prosecuted without subjecting the alleged
389
Such an adjustment, the court obvictims to cross-examination.
People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 261–62 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a videotaped interview of a seven-year-old child abuse victim by a specially trained
interviewer was an interrogation in spite of the fact that it was conducted in a relaxed
setting and used non-leading and open-ended questioning).
385
See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 603 S.E.2d 559, 562–63 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that an assault victim’s verbatim narrative statement taken by an officer was the
product of interrogation and thus testimonial, as was the victim’s subsequent photo
identification of the assailant).
386
See, e.g., United States v. Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 581–82 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing that answers given to questions about who had access to the place where drugs
were found, when asked by agents executing a search warrant, were testimonial).
387
See, e.g., United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding
that such a statement falls “squarely within Professor Friedman’s paradigm: ‘A statement made knowingly to the authorities that describes criminal activity is almost
always testimonial’” (citing Friedman, supra note 36, at 1042))).
388
833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005).
389
Id. at 559. The court commented:
We recognize the ground shift this means for the prosecution of
crimes, in strategy and method. The remedy of calling out-of-court declarants to the stand will not always be available, although it should be
noted that they need only appear, not affirm their previous statement.
Likewise, we recognize the particular impact this decision may have on
the prosecution of domestic violence, as well as some gang-related
crimes, which have been prosecuted not infrequently based on out-ofcourt statements in the absence of the initial complaining witness. In
such cases, however, the prosecution can still present powerful evidence that a crime has occurred and that the defendant was the
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served, is essential in order to conform “to the dictates of the Confrontation Clause as it is now understood,” adding, “[t]he system,
390
over time, must adjust.”
In Gonsalves, a woman overheard her twenty-year-old daughter
391
The mother
arguing with her boyfriend in a nearby bedroom.
392
heard “yelling, screaming, and crying.” When she entered the bedroom, the boyfriend was gone and her daughter was on her bed
393
crying. When her mother asked what had happened, the daughter
394
described being assaulted by her boyfriend.
Although neither the
victim nor her mother called the police, they arrived fifteen minutes
after the argument began, but after the defendant had left and the
395
Upon their arrival, the victim was ambulatory
assault had ended.
but “hysterical, ranting, loud, hyperventilating, and pacing around
396
397
the room.” The officers observed no apparent visible injuries. In
response to their query as to what happened, the victim described the
attack and identified her assailant by name and by physical descrip398
399
This interview took no more than five minutes.
The
tion.
specific details of her statement were recorded in the officer’s inci400
dent report.
The Massachusetts court recognized that under Crawford, in circumstances where the declarant is not presently—nor has she
previously been—subject to cross-examination by the accused, the
central issue regarding the admissibility of hearsay in a criminal
prosecution under the Confrontation Clause is whether the hearsay is
401
“testimonial.”
Additionally, it recognized that were the hearsay to
perpetrator. In the case at bar, the Commonwealth could offer the responding officer’s testimony as to the complainant’s physical
appearance, her screams, her medical records, and photographs, as
well as testimony from the mother as to the complainant’s screams and
the fact that no one else was in a position to have inflicted her injuries.
There will be an unavoidable adjustment period as past practices are
modified and new approaches are developed.
Id. (citations omitted).
390
Id.
391
Id. at 552.
392
Id.
393
Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 552.
394
Id.
395
Id.
396
Id.
397
Id.
398
Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 552–53.
399
Id. at 552.
400
Id. at 561.
401
Id. at 552.
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be classified as “testimonial” under these circumstances, the Clause
402
would bar its introduction.
The court noted that Crawford had concluded that some hearsay
would always be classified as “testimonial,” such as an affidavit, deposition, confession, testimony at a preliminary hearing, testimony
before a grand jury and at trial, and statements that are the product
403
of police interrogation.
The Massachusetts court concluded these
404
statements are “per se testimonial and no further analysis is necessary.”
Apparently, if the statement falls within this “per se” category, the declarant’s motivation in giving it is not considered. For example, if the
statement were the product of police interrogation, the fact that the
emotional state of the declarant precluded awareness of the prosecutorial use that may be made of her statement would not be a relevant
concern. In addressing the per se category, the court concentrated
on the question of what constitutes “interrogation” in its colloquial
405
sense, as that term was used in Crawford. As indicated earlier, this
court gave an appropriately broad interpretation to the term “interrogation,” stating that it “must be understood expansively to mean all
law enforcement questioning related to the investigation or prosecu406
Though its expansive interpretation would not
tion of a crime.”
encompass police questioning to “secure a volatile scene or to establish the need for or provide medical care,” it would include
“investigatory interrogation,” such as preliminary fact gathering and
407
assessment whether a crime has taken place.”
Under this court’s analytical approach, if it is determined that
the statement cannot be classified as testimonial per se, additional
analysis would be required. Statements not deemed testimonial per
se would include statements made in response to officers seeking to
secure the scene or to determine the need for medical care, statements made to persons unconnected to law enforcement, and
408
In this second
unprompted spontaneous statements to anyone.
analytical step, a court should evaluate whether the statement should

402

Id.
Id. at 554, 561.
404
Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 554 (emphasis added).
405
See supra notes 359–63 and accompanying text.
406
Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 555.
407
Id. at 556–57 (disagreeing with the concurrence that judges will have difficulty
delineating the difference between police questions that are or are not testimonial;
this interpretation saying that judges are “familiar” and “well equipped” to make the
necessary distinctions).
408
Id. at 557.
403
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be classified as “testimonial in fact.”
Seeking a “tool” to aid courts
in resolving this classification issue, the court adopted the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ articulation of a test: “‘The proper inquiry,
then, is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony against the
accused. That intent, in turn, may be determined by querying whether
a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would anticipate his statement
410
being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime.’”
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court elaborated that this test
does not require any formality in the statement nor knowledge of ju411
Its focus is on the intent of the
dicial processes by the declarant.
412
declarant determined by evaluating the surrounding circumstances.
The court concluded that “all statements the declarant knew or
should have known might be used to investigate or prosecute an ac413
cused” should be classified as de facto testimonial.
Applying the two-step analysis to the facts of record in the instant
414
case, the court concluded that the victim’s statements to responding officers were the product of police interrogation (the scene had
been secured and there was no apparent medical concern at the time
of the interview), and therefore her generated statements would be
deemed per se testimonial and inadmissible were she to remain un415
available for trial. No further analysis was required. Regarding the
daughter’s statements to the mother prior to the arrival of the police,
the court (on a “limited record”) concluded that they were not per se
testimonial since they were not “part of an affidavit, deposition, confession, or prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury,
or at a former trial or procured through law enforcement interroga416
Necessarily taking the second analytical step, the court
tion.”
concluded that the victim’s statements to her mother were also not
testimonial in fact, explaining:
Nothing in the record indicates the complainant offered the
statements in order to establish the facts for later use by law en409

Id.
Id. at 558 (quoting United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004).
411
Id.
412
Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 558.
413
Id.
414
The state requested an interlocutory review of an adverse pre-trial ruling on a
motion in limine, which excluded the statements as testimonial under Crawford. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court granted review and through this decision vacated the lower court’s order, but remanded for further pretrial proceedings and
instructed that the parties must be given an opportunity to reopen the evidence in
light of the opinion. Id. at 562.
415
Id.
416
Id.
410
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forcement. We see no reason why a reasonable person in the
complainant’s position would anticipate that her statement, made
in her own bedroom, to her mother, apparently without any
knowledge that the police would become involved, would be used
against the defendant in investigating and prosecuting the alleged
417
assault.

The Gonsalves court’s analytical approach, being faithful to the
core values of the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by Crawford,
deserves emulation by other jurisdictions struggling for a viable and
straightforward solution to the perplexing problem of determining
the compatibility of hearsay under the Confrontation Clause.
B. Crawford’s Retroactive Application
Any discussion of Crawford’s impact must consider the retroactive
application of its remarkably altered construction of the Confrontation Clause’s relationship to the introduction of testimonial hearsay.
Clearly, the Court’s establishment of a new rule concerning the admissibility of testimonial evidence under the Confrontation Clause
must be given retroactive application to all criminal cases still pend418
Though it may be applicable to
ing at the time of the decision.
pending cases, whether the accused had to preserve a confrontation
417

Id.
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) (“When a decision of this
Court results in a ‘new rule,’ that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on
direct review.” (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987))). See also People v. Price, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 237–38 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that while Crawford
itself does not address retroactivity, both parties in this case agreed it applied to the
case at hand because “even a nonretroactive decision governs cases that are not yet
final when the decision is announced”); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 854
(Ct. App. 2004) (holding that “Crawford indubitably applies retroactively in this case”
(citing Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 348)); State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 932, 938 (La. Ct. App.
2004) (“Even though the decision in Crawford is very recent, other courts have already considered its application to cases which had been tried before Crawford was
decided. . . . [T]he Fifth Circuit applied the Crawford test even though Crawford was
decided after the conclusion of [a] trial . . . . Other courts have also held Crawford to
be applicable even though it was decided after the trial in those cases.” (citations
omitted)); People v. Bell, 689 N.W.2d 732, 734 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (applying
Crawford retrospectively because the case was on appeal when Crawford was announced); Samarron v. State, 150 S.W.3d 701, 706 n.6 (Tex. App. 2004) (noting that
no retroactivity analysis is needed because the case was still on direct appeal and not
yet final when Crawford was announced).
In a rare case, a proceeding may not be final until habeas relief has been exhausted. See, e.g., Ash v. Reilly, 354 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding
Crawford applicable in a parole revocation proceeding, in spite of the fact that under
the department’s regulations revocation of parole is final and non-appealable, since
the only permissible judicial review available was by habeas and such had not been
exhausted).
418
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issue by objection in the trial court is subject to some disagreement.
The more difficult question is whether, in post-conviction or habeas
corpus proceedings, the Crawford rule should apply retroactively to
cases that were final when Crawford was rendered.
The starting point for this issue’s resolution is the Supreme
420
Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane.
There, the Supreme Court, reviving Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity in cases collaterally
421
attacking a conviction, held that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure” are not applicable in cases where the conviction had
422
become final before the new rule was announced.
However, the
Teague Court specified that retroactive application of a new rule
would be permitted under two circumstances: (1) if the new rule
categorizes private individual conduct as beyond the authority of the
criminal law to regulate; and (2) if the new rule can be classified as a
423
“watershed” rule of criminal procedure.
The first exception is
clearly not implicated by the Crawford decision. However, Crawford
must be examined to determine if it actually creates a “new rule” as
contemplated by Teague. Noting that it is often difficult to determine
whether a decision proclaims a new rule, Teague made this observation:
[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.
To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s con424
viction became final.
419

Compare People v. Kilday, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 161, 169 (Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting
forfeiture by failure to object where an objection below, if made, would have been
futile and without support of then-existing law), and Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 854 (rejecting waiver by failure to object below in cases, such as this, where the change in
the law is so unpredictable that it could not have been reasonably foreseen by trial
counsel), with Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798, 801 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (expressing doubt that the issue was preserved because of a failure to raise an objection
based upon the Confrontation Clause unlike what was done in Crawford), and Courson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 125, 129 (Tex. App. 2005) (observing that Crawford clearly
pointed out that the right of confrontation is neither “new nor novel” and therefore
an objection on confrontation grounds was necessary to preserve the issue). See also
United States v. Solomon, 399 F.3d 1231, 1237–38 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding a Crawford error had not been preserved and refusing to address it in the absence of a
determination that it was plain error); State v. Page, 104 P.3d 616, 622–23 (Or. Ct.
App. 2005) (finding a Crawford violation was “plain error,” justifying review even
though the error had not been preserved).
420
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
421
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692–93 (1971).
422
Teague at 310.
423
Id. at 311.
424
Id. at 301.
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The majority in Crawford, though clearly rejecting Roberts’s previously applied analytical framework, exhaustively surveyed the results
of the Court’s previous decisions and concluded that those results
were consistent with its current decision:
Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial
have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and
only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross425
examine.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion, though criticizing the majority’s rejection of the Roberts analytical approach, noted that the
result the majority reached “follows inexorably from Roberts and its
426
progeny . . . .” In light of this, one United States District Court concluded that Crawford did not establish a new rule and therefore its
reasoning can be applied in a post-conviction proceeding involving a
427
case that was final before the decision was handed down.
The Ninth Circuit, conceding that the ambiguity of Justice
Scalia’s opinion makes it plausible that Crawford was simply a “correction of a misinterpretation” and not a “new rule,” rejected this
428
contention, stating: “On balance, an analysis of the historical application of the Confrontation Clause cases leads to the conclusion that
Crawford announces a new rule that must be put through the
429
Most courts considering the retroac[Teague-]Summerlin strainer.”
tive effect of the Crawford decision under the Teague guidelines have
so far concluded or assumed that Crawford does indeed announce a
new rule and have simply considered whether the second Teague ex430
ception applied.
425

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004) (citations omitted).
Id. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
427
Richardson v. Newland, 342 F. Supp. 2d 900, 924 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (observing
that the Crawford Court’s “opinion makes clear that the Supreme Court had never
applied Roberts to out-of-court testimonial statements. . . . Crawford did not articulate a
change in procedure, it merely reaffirmed and clarified procedures that had long
been in place.”).
428
Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005).
429
Id. at 1015–16 (finding that Crawford’s new rule satisfied the “watershed” exception in Teague and therefore was applicable to the case). See also Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352–53 (2004) (distinguishing between substantive and
procedural rules in determining retroactivity); see infra note 434 and accompanying
text (exploring Summerlin further).
430
See generally Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859 (7th Cir 2005); Murillo v. Frank,
402 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2005); Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1012; Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d
327 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2004); Hiracheta v.
Att’y Gen. of Cal., 105 F. App’x 937 (9th Cir. 2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438
(8th Cir. 2004); Coleman v. United States, No. Civ.A.04-4803, CRIM.A.01-038, 2005
426
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There has been, and will probably continue to be, debate over
whether Crawford’s new rule is a “watershed” rule as contemplated by
431
Teague, which suggests that such watershed rules would be rare,
would have to “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular
432
conviction,” and significantly reduce the impermissible risk that the
innocent would be convicted by enhancing the pre-existing fact433
finding procedures.
Contemporaneous with the Crawford decision,
the Supreme Court recently emphasized: “That a new procedural
rule is ‘fundamental’ in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule
must be one, ‘without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction
434
is seriously diminished.’” An example of a new procedural rule that
435
would qualify as a watershed rule was the Gideon v. Wainwright decision, which created the right to court-appointed counsel for indigent
436
defendants.
So far, the prevailing view is that the new rule in Crawford does
437
not qualify under the Teague exception as a watershed rule. Adherents to this view suggest Crawford’s new rule is not of the “magnitude”

WL 1595427 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 2005); People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2004); Danforth v. State, 700 N.W.2d 530 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); People v.
Dobbin, 791 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 2004); People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL
2567124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (en banc); In re Markel, 111 P.3d 249 (Wash.
2005).
431
One court noted that, in the fifteen years since the Teague decision, only on
eleven occasions has the Supreme Court considered whether a new rule qualified as
a watershed rule warranting retroactive application to cases finalized before the new
rule’s creation, and in each instance, the Court held that the new rule was not.
Muyet v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 4247, 2004 WL 2997866, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27,
2004).
432
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).
433
Id.
434
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 354–56 (2004) (holding that the new procedural rule precluding a sentencing judge, without a jury, from making factual
aggravating findings required to impose the death penalty was not a watershed rule
because it was not necessary to ensure accurate fact-finding and to prevent miscarriages of justice; therefore the rule does not apply retroactively to cases in which a
conviction is already final) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313)).
435
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
436
See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 407 (2004) (“This Court has yet to find a new
rule that falls under this exception. In providing guidance as to what might do so,
the Court has repeatedly, and only, referred to the right-to-counsel rule of Gideon v.
Wainwright which ‘altered [the Court’s] understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.’”) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted).
437
See supra note 430 (cataloging several decisions espousing this view). See also
Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying Teague, but without explanation, and holding that Crawford’s new rule was not retroactive).
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of Gideon, since Crawford did not “cut a new rule from whole cloth.”
Since the Crawford rule does not necessarily enhance accuracy deter439
minations in criminal cases, and since Crawford violations may be
excused under the harmless error analysis, it is difficult to conclude
440
that the rule “alters rights fundamental to due process.”
441
442
The Ninth Circuit and two New York court decisions have
concluded that the new Crawford rule is a watershed rule under
Teague and is applicable retroactively in post-conviction cases. The
Ninth Circuit, applying the Summerlin test, concluded that retroactive
application of the new rule in Crawford is required in order to avoid
the likelihood of the serious diminution of the accuracy of convictions and stated: “The difference between pre- and post-Crawford
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence is not the sort of change that can
be dismissed as merely incremental. Instead, it is an ‘absolute pre443
requisite to fundamental fairness.’” The court rejected the contention that a rule of constitutional law that is susceptible to a harmless
444
It
error analysis could not also be a “bedrock rule of procedure.”
explained that the two concepts “hinge” on different considerations.
The harmless error rule “depends on whether the impact of the error
can be measured,” while the determination of whether a new rule is a
bedrock rule depends on whether “it increases the likelihood of ac445
curate convictions.”
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
conclusion that Crawford enhances reliability or accuracy in some

438

People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118, 1123 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (“[Crawford] did
not define or otherwise alter our understanding of the meaning of the right itself.”).
See also Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Unlike Gideon,
Crawford does not ‘alter[] our understanding of what constitutes basic due process,’
but merely sets out new standards for the admission of certain kinds of hearsay.”) (citation omitted).
439
Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335 (2d Cir. 2004) (“As we see the operation
of the Crawford rule, it is likely to improve accuracy in some circumstances and diminish it in others.”). This Second Circuit decision makes a compelling argument
that, though Crawford will invariably exclude unreliable testimonial hearsay, it will
also exclude testimonial hearsay that under the prior Roberts rule would have been
admissible precisely because it was reliable, and thereby Crawford will diminish rather
than enhance accuracy. Id. at 335–36.
440
Uphoff, 381 F.3d at 1226–27.
441
Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005).
442
People v. Dobbin, 791 N.Y.S.2d 897, 905–06 (Sup. Ct. 2004); People v. Watson,
No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (en banc).
443
Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 244 (1990)).
444
Id. at 1021.
445
Id. at 1020.
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446

cases but not in others and for that reason should not qualify as a
“watershed” rule, stating:
The flaw in this analysis is that the Second Circuit has substituted
its judgment of whether the Crawford rule is one without which
the accuracy of conviction is seriously diminished, for the Supreme Court’s considered judgment. The Court has found
repeatedly that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to
447
promote accuracy . . . .

Expressing a similar view, one New York judge concluded:
[T]he violation of a defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness
who has made a testimonial statement against him or her, according to Crawford, calls into question the reliability of the testimony
admitted at trial. This concern implicates the fundamental fairness of the trial, may have a significant effect on the integrity of
the fact-finding process, and could compromise the jury’s determination of a defendant’s guilt, as long-standing Supreme Court
precedent has shown. Accordingly, applying Teague’s teachings,
this court finds that the rule announced in Crawford is a “watershed” rule of Criminal Procedure, and thus applies to cases on
448
collateral review.

Given Teague’s extremely high standard for qualifying under
the watershed rule exception, it is unlikely that Crawford’s “new rule”
meets it. Though retroactive application of Crawford’s new rule could
dramatically enhance the accuracy of the determination of guilt in
some cases, it would not likely have such effect in others. In spite of
the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion to the contrary, it appears that, to
meet the Gideon example, the accuracy enhancement must pervasively apply in all cases.
C. The Confrontation Clause and Non-Testimonial Hearsay: the
Remaining Viability of the Roberts Reliability Approach
Clearly, the Crawford Court rejected the Roberts “reliability approach” as it applied to testimonial hearsay, articulating the following
reasons:
The legacy of Roberts in other courts vindicates the Framers’ wisdom in rejecting a general reliability exception. The framework

446

Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335 (2004) (“[The Crawford Rule] is likely to
improve accuracy in some circumstances and diminish it in others.”).
447
Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1020.
448
People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *7–8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004)
(en banc) (recognizing as well that lower federal courts have, for the most part and
with little analysis, disagreed).
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is so unpredictable that it fails to provide meaningful protection
from even core confrontation violations.
Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.
There are countless factors bearing on whether a statement is reliable . . . . Whether a statement is deemed reliable depends
heavily on which factors the judge considers and how much
weight he accords each of them. Some courts wind up attaching
the same significance to opposite facts. . . .
The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its
unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant
449
to exclude.

Though Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor stated their
450
“dissent from the Court’s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts,” a close
examination of the majority’s opinion does not warrant this emphatic
characterization of the impact of the decision on the continued viability of the Roberts analytical approach.
Justice Scalia, in the majority opinion, noted that as to nontestimonial hearsay, “it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design
to afford the states flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as
does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such state451
ments from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.” Clearly, the
Court left for “another day” the determination of the Confrontation
Clause’s role, if any, in the regulation of non-testimonial hearsay and
whether the Roberts reliability approach should have any continued
452
It is plausible that, to get the consensus of
vitality in this context.
seven judges, a significant majority, on a monumental clarification of
the Confrontation Clause, it was necessary to leave open the possibility of a continued role for Roberts to play with respect to non453
testimonial hearsay.
Lower courts, however, have struggled with
this question on the possibility of Roberts’s continued role.
In one post-Crawford case, an Oklahoma appellate court applying
the Roberts two-pronged analytical approach to non-testimonial hearsay read Justice Scalia’s comment in Crawford regarding nontestimonial hearsay as having “noted that non-testimonial hearsay
449

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62–63 (2004).
Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
451
Id. at 68.
452
Id.
453
As one post-Crawford court noted, “A close reading of Crawford indicates that
Roberts still applies to non-testimonial hearsay evidence, though the Court appears split
on whether it should.” State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (N.M. 2004) (emphasis
added).
450
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might still be admissible against an accused in a criminal trial if both
prongs of Roberts were satisfied, regardless of whether the defendant
454
The
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.”
Oklahoma court found the non-testimonial hearsay—a confession
made to fellow inmates, which implicated the declarant and the defendant—lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and therefore, under
455
the Confrontation Clause, it should not have been admitted.
In
another case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals read the same
Scalia comment and concluded: “Although Crawford overrules the
Roberts framework to the extent that it applies to testimonial statements, Roberts remains good law regarding non-testimonial
456
statements.” The North Carolina court went on to conclude that a
non-testimonial excited utterance was reliable, as it fell within a
457
“firmly rooted” hearsay exception.
A Florida appellate court, however, read Justice Scalia’s comment and reached the opposite
458
conclusion. The Florida court stated that “Crawford made clear that
where non-testimonial hearsay is at issue, such as that involved in this
case, the individual states have ‘flexibility in their development of
hearsay law’ and can even exempt such statements from confronta459
tion clause scrutiny altogether.” The court, upon determining that
the admitted statement was non-testimonial, ended the inquiry and
460
affirmed.

454

Miller v. State, 98 P.3d 738, 743 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004).
Id. at 748.
456
State v. Blackstock, 598 S.E.2d 412, 423 n.2 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
457
Id. at 423. See also Rios v. Lansing, 116 F. App’x 983, 988 (10th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Justice Scalia’s comment regarding the treatment of non-testimonial hearsay, the court concluded simply: “Because non-testimonial hearsay is at issue here,
the reliability test of Roberts still applies”).
458
Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So. 2d 66, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). See also Purvis v. State, 829 N.E.2d 572, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Justice Scalia’s
ambiguous comment and concluding: “Thus, when the hearsay statements at issue
are not testimonial, ordinary state law evidence laws and rules determine their admissibility”).
459
Herrera-Vega, 888 So. 2d at 69 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68
(2004)).
460
Id.
455
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In contrast, most courts, if they even address the issue, are
more cautious and simply note the ambiguity. After determining the
statement to be non-testimonial, most courts go on to apply the Roberts two-pronged analytical approach, choosing to err on the side of
caution in case the Supreme Court later declares Roberts to have con462
tinued vitality. However, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
applying the Roberts framework to non-testimonial co-conspirator
statements, categorically concluded: “Crawford did not alter the application of Roberts to non-testimonial statements; therefore, we accept
463
the continued viability of Roberts to such statements.”
461

Not all courts acknowledge that there is an issue as to Roberts’ applicability to
non-testimonial statements. See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83–84 (1st Cir.
2004) (holding Crawford inapplicable unless statements are testimonial and applying
Roberts to non-testimonial statements); People v. Shepherd, 689 N.W.2d 721, 729
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding simply that “Crawford left Roberts intact regarding
admissibility of non-testimonial hearsay”).
Other post-Crawford cases, without mentioning the issue, end their Confrontation Clause inquiry and resolve the case after simply determining the hearsay in
question was non-testimonial under Crawford. See, e.g., Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d
144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (determining that “inspection and operator certifications are simply not included in the class of evidence” giving rise to Crawford
concerns); Texas v. Woods, 152 S.W.3d 105, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (finding the
statements in question did not “fall within the categories of testimonial evidence described in Crawford”).
462
See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[W]hile the
continued viability of Roberts with respect to nontestimonial statements is somewhat
in doubt, we will assume for purposes of this opinion that its reliability analysis continues to control nontestimonial hearsay . . . .”); see also United States v. Franklin, 415
F.3d 537, 546 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting with approval the assumption described in
Saget); State v. Doe, 103 P.3d 967, 972 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004) (concluding the Supreme Court left it “open to dispute” as to whether Crawford “abrogates” Roberts as to
non-testimonial hearsay, this court determined that “caution requires” the Roberts test
be applied); State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 326–27 (Neb. 2004) (noting that Crawford made “no explicit statement regarding non-testimonial hearsay” but simply
suggested that the Confrontation Clause may have no role in regulating such or that
Roberts and its progeny may still apply to statements that are non-testimonial; although apparently convinced that no constitutional confrontation scrutiny need be
applied to non-testimonial hearsay after Crawford, the court went on to apply the Roberts test anyway); State v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760, 780 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting the
ambiguous language in Crawford, and stating: “Accordingly, we turn to analyze
whether [the nontestimonial statement] fall[s] under a firmly rooted hearsay exception or else bear[s] particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. . . .”); State v.
Manuel, 685 N.W.2d 525, 532–33 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (reasoning that, because Crawford did not “expressly overrule Roberts” and its answer on this issue was “equivocal,”
the question remains open as to what constitutional test is to be applied to nontestimonial hearsay; the court went on, in an “abundance of caution,” to apply the
Roberts test to non-testimonial hearsay).
463
Hammond v. United States, 880 A.2d 1066, 1099 (D.C. 2005). See also United
States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding persuasive the argument
that the Roberts framework survives Crawford as to non-testimonial hearsay); Manuel,
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The likelihood of Roberts’s survival after Crawford appears
unlikely since much of the criticism leveled by Crawford at the Roberts
analytical approach as applied to testimonial hearsay would apply
464
equally to non-testimonial hearsay.
Crawford criticizes the Roberts
approach as vague, amorphous, subjectively applied, and leading to
contradictory conclusions regarding the same factors when consid465
However, the cautionary
ered by different judges or courts.
approach taken by many courts in applying Roberts to non-testimonial
hearsay, in the absence of a clear determination of the issue by the
Supreme Court, appears to be prudent.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Crawford was correct to take the difficult,
but necessary, step of rejecting the jurisprudence derived from the
Roberts reliability approach and thereby restoring confrontation to its
true purpose, which is ensuring that the accused has a meaningful
opportunity to participate, through cross-examination, in the development of the testimonial evidence produced against him or her.
The Crawford decision accurately revealed what many previously recognized: the Roberts reliability approach was seriously flawed and, as a
result, capable of inconsistent application and the facilitation of the
egregious introduction of core testimonial evidence that the Clause
was designed to forbid. Because of the demonstrated flaws of the
Roberts analytical approach, the Supreme Court should, in the near
future, clearly discard its use even in the regulation of nontestimonial hearsay under the Clause.
Post-Crawford jurisprudence has shown both predictable and unpredictable controversy regarding the application of the key—but not
clearly delineated—“testimonial” classification. The Supreme Court
must clarify more precisely the parameters of the constitutional scope
466
of testimonial hearsay. It must do so by describing appropriate and

697 N.W.2d at 826 (“We accept [the] argument that Roberts ought to be retained for
nontestimonial hearsay, as we agree that evidence that may be admissible under the
hearsay rules may nevertheless still be inadmissible under the Confrontation
Clause.”).
464
Doe, 103 P.3d at 972 (noting that support for the conclusion that Roberts is abrogated and should not be applied to non-testimonial hearsay may be founded upon
the fact that “Crawford thoroughly criticizes the failing of the Roberts reliability analysis
and the inconsistencies in application that it has wrought”).
465
See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (exploring more fully many criticisms of Roberts).
466
Perhaps in a manner consistent with the Massachusetts Approach described
supra notes 388–417 and accompanying text.
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concrete factual applications of this term and not by perpetuating
vague, broad formulations, which are too often applied in contradictory and inconsistent ways. The Supreme Court, in delineating the
precise contours of the term “testimonial,” should ensure the inclusion of statements by victims and others, knowingly describing or
reporting historical information concerning the commission of a
crime and its perpetrator to law enforcement personnel, or those
known to be acting on behalf of law enforcement. Such inclusion
should not depend on the relative closeness in time of the statement
to the criminal incident reported nor on the emotional state of the
declarant.
Finally, the Supreme Court needs to affirm the current postCrawford majority position that the “new rule” announced in Crawford does not fall within the Teague “watershed” exception. Even
though the rule might significantly increase the accuracy of the truth
determining process in a particular case, it would not do so pervasively in all cases. Thus, Crawford’s new rule regarding regulation of
testimonial hearsay under the Confrontation Clause falls short of the
polestar Gideon “watershed” standard and should not be applied to
cases that were final before its announcement.

